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German-American relations in the Third World constitute
a vital concern to the entire international community and
represent a particularly important subject for American
policymakers at this time. Over the past three decades, the
FRG has developed into one of the most important and stable
allies of the United States. Howaver, during the same
period the FRG, once little more than a protectorate of the
OS, has become a medium-sized power, showing great economic
strength and growing independence in pursuit of its national
interest. Though the FRG* s interests continue to strongly
link it to the Western alliance, its increased economic
strength, growing independence in international relations,
and a more complex international environment makes differ-
ences of opinion between Germany and America more likely.
Today German- American relations and foreign policy toward
the Third World are complementary. However, there are
differences and potential conflicts. This study examines
ths Third World policies of the FRG and the US in an attempt
to determine whether or not they are likely to be a cause of
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL EN7IR0NMENT
Over the past 36 years, the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) has developed into one of the most important and
stable allies of the United States. During the same period,
however, the FRG, once little more than a dependent divided
country has become a medium sized power in its own right.
Though still aware of its American nuclear protection as
well as the network of common interest and outlook tying it
to the NATO alliance, the FRG is begining to show a growing
independence in the pursuit of its national interest. This
independence is due largely to the increased freedom of
diplomatic movement acquired through Ostpolitik - a policy
that gave the FRG flexibility to work for a better economic
and political relationship with East European states. West
Germany's rise from the status of a client state to that of
a full partner has brought about a number of problems for
U.S. -German relations, issues related to the Third World.
A changing international environment has created possi-
bilities for Germany to expand its global influence. The
new international environment, with the advent of nuclear
equivalence between the U.S. and USSR and the growing impor-
tance of economic issues in international relations,
requires states to pursue the combination of political and
economic policies for which Germany is well suited. The
increased influence enjoyed by the FRG today is based or. its
economic potential, on its freedom of maneuver acquired
through Ostpolitik, and on its NATO allies and the European
Economic Community (EEC) . Germany can use its growing
influence and economic policies in the Third World as well

as in East and West relations, to help protect its security
interests. By working with its partners in a European
system in which it increasingly plays a larger role, Germany
can count not only on its cwn resources but often on those
of Western Europe as a whole. Increasingly, Germany is in a
position to operate independently of the United States,
either unilateraly or in concert with other European coun-
tries. However, Germany continues to suffer from deep
vulnerabilities. In dealing with all nations, it must live
with its history, with relative military weakness, and with
the division of the German nation. In dealing with the
Third World, and especially the resource countries, it must
overcome its import dependence.
At the same time the FRG's influence is increasing, so
is its insecurity, and so is America's vulnerabilities. The
U.S. now depends on many foreign resources, most notably
oil. Amer ican well being is more exposed to outside events
than before, whether those events are political or economic
in nature. The United States can no longer chart its own
course without concern for how others might react. The U.S.
has to count on its allies more than before.
Although possessing clearly superior military clout and
economic resources, America has not been able to bring its
full strength to bear in the new international environment.
Americans' views of the world and of themselves were changed
by the Vietnam and Watergate experiences. Although events
in Iran and Afghanistan sparked a rebirth of patriotic
sentiment, the effects of these earlier attitudes and
changes continue.
The combination of increasing German power and indepen-
dence and a more complex international situation makes
differences of opinion between Germany and America more
likely. Today the United States and Germany must coordinate

their policies on a wide range of problems that may arise
all over the globe, whether political, economic, or even
military. Minerals, apartheid, instability in southern
Africa, lines of communication (LOC) , and human rights in
Latin America are only a few examples of policy issues that
require discussion. Now that economic issues have come to
occupy such a central role in international relations
without security issues being any less important it is
almost certain that disagreements will develop.
Today , there is a sense that the FRG has a wider range
of options, or that at the very least Germany must go along
with alliance decisions, not with American wishes.
Therefore, differences must be resolved on the basis of
common agreement on the problem and on the policies neces-
sary to solve it. Moreover, the range of issues on which
differences can arise is wider than ever. Today German -
American relations and foreign policy toward the Third World
are basically complementary. However, there have been and
continue to be important differences and potential conflicts
between these two countries . My analysis will examine the
extent of the differences in order to understand them and
determine if they are growing.
B. THE ISSUES
Before addressing German-American differences in the
Third World in detail it is necessary to survey German
foreign policy toward the Third World. The general focus
will address the following important questions: (1) What are
the determinants of German foreign policy toward the Third
World? (2) What are German interest in the Third World-
economic, military, political, or a combination? (3) Does
Germany see the Third World in East-West, North-South, or
West-South terms? (4) Which issues and areas are priority
10

concerns of Germany? The more specific aim of this analysis
is to: (1) Examine the major US/FRG policies toward the
Third World, (2) Determine if there is a convergence between
OS and German views of the Soviet threat to the Third World,
(3) Determine if there are differences between the US and
German preferred strategies for dealing with Third World
conflicts, and (4) Investigate differences between as and
German posture toward the New International Economic Order
(NIEO).
C. GERMANY'S CHANGING POSITION IN THE WORLD VIS-A-VIS THE
UNITED STATES: A HISTORICAL DIMENSION OF GERHAN-AHERICAN
RELATIONS
In the early 1970s Germany emerged as a strong actor in
world affairs. Previously, the Germans concentrated upon
affairs at home and in Europe. Beyond those areas, the
United States was regarded as the protector of German inter-
ests, with the world economic and security system led by the
United States essentially supplying Germany's needs. West
Germany developed extensive trade relations with many coun-
tries, but abstained from political involvement, main-
taining a low profile policy. Its policy was based largely
on the Hallstein Doctrine, under which it would break rela-
tions with any state that recognized East Germany. The
Hallstein Doctrine was proclaimed by Bonn in the late
fifties when both the rival German states were begining to
develop more active policies of trade, aid, and dipolmatic
relations throughout the world. This doctrine explicitly
embodied in the FRG the right of sole representation of the
German nation and laid down the rule that no state (except
the USSR) could be permitted to maintain diplomatic rela-
tions with Bonn as well as the GDR. This dominant influence
in Bonn's foreign relations was a factor that inhibited
11

development of more flexible and constructive relationships-
for instance, with the Arab states in the sixties; and it
meant that Bonn's diplomats in Third World countries were
excessively preoccupied by the need to monitor and to
counter the influence of the GDR. [Ref. 1]. AT the same
time West Germans perceived world events in the mirror of
their own immediate concerns near home and saw no reason for
any independent or significant world role. [Ref. 2].
This situation changed in the late 1960s and early
1970s. The US r because of Vietnam, Watergate, the recession
of 1973, and the oil crisis, was less able to protect German
interests internationally. After the 1973, Arab-Israeli war
and the drastic oil price hike of 1973, raw material shor-
tages and high petroleum prices became a dominant concern of
German policy makers. Moves by the U.S. and USSR to estab-
lish detente and the movement by the FRG away from the
Hallstein Doctrine freed Germany to move more freely on the
international scene. Germany began to play a greater
international role not only economically but also
politically.
As its freedom to act in world affairs has expanded the
FRG has tended to move on the world scene largely in concert
with partners in the European Community (EC) . This suits
the German desire to maintain a low profile. German poli-
cies in the world as a whole still concentrate heavily on
economic relations, but they have also developed through the
EC and separately a notable political content.
German policy as part of the EC has occasionally put the
FRG in disagreement, with the as, when a majority of the EC
wanted to pursue policies different from the as. In these
cases, the FRG has tried to play a mediating role, not aban-
doning EC policies but attempting to structure them in order
to reduce conflict with as policy.
12

There are exceptions to Germany's general policy of
acting in concert with its EC partners. One example of this
is the sale of German civilian nuclear technology abroad.
In this area Germany has acted on its own. This industry
was regarded by the Germans in the 1960s and early 1970s as
a key element in their strategy to stay in the lead of
international technology exports. After 1973 f the Germans
also saw this industry as a way to greater energy and
economic independence. The Germans have sold nuclear power
plants to a number of states. The biggest and most sensi-
tive contract was with Brazil for $5 billion signed in 1975.
This contract created a crisis between the FRG and the as
when the US challenged it a s a potential source of prolifer-
ation in an area of particular OS sensitivity-Latin America.
Today the FRG has a European relation and a US rela-
tion. Germany attempts to develop a European consensus that
will not create a rift with the OS. At the same time,
Germany does not want to be perceived as Washington's puppet
or as Europe's directing power.
Germany's relationship with the OS has shown, over
many years and through many changes of political leader-
ships, a striking absence of major conflicts at all levels.
Despite a successful record of coordination in the face of
pressures that might have been extremely disruptive,
tensions and conflicts in the Third World do exist between
Washington and Bonn and require a close examination. At
least three of these issues threaten to cause serious fric-
tion. These issues are first, how to respond to the demands
of the world's poorer countries for a new economic order in
North-South relations; second, how to deal with Third World
conflicts; and finally, how to respond to the Soviet threat
to the Third World. It must be determined if areas of fric-
tion are minor or whether they are expressions of a deep-




In this study I will not attempt to list all the current
or potential issues of the German-American North-South
dialogue. That would require a major book, since it would
relate to virtually all significant international problems.
Nor will I describe personal relations of senior officials.
Instead, I will look at the foundations of the relationship
and use some central issues and oases to illustrate the
importance and complexity.
Chapter II deals with the formulation of German foreign
policy and how policy is a reflection of certain interests.
This chapter is intended to highlight the motivations behind
the FRG policies toward the Third World in the NIEO, how
they relate to OS Third World policy and OS policy toward
the World as a whole. Chapter III examines the OS and FRG
strategy toward Third World conflicts and the Soviet threat.
This chapter will explain how the Sermans view the Third
World in a West-South framework rather than in terms of
East-West conflicts, Germany feels the Soviets are losing
influence and with patience, most countries can be moved out
of the Soviet camp. Two case studies, South Africa/Namibia
and El Salvador, will be used to illustrate and explain
findings in chapter III. Tensions currently exits between
the O.S. and the FRG. Germany has attempted to deal with
these tensions, both in its position as a member of the NATO
alliance and as a junior partner to the OS, even with
growing conflicts over peripheral Third World countries.
Finally, chapter IV will conclude with a summary of the
differences in OS/FRG Third World policies and argue that
even though differences will continue, common interest are
strong and stable enough to overcome all differences if
careful and responsible effort is made on both sides.
14

II. THE OS AND FRG IN THE NIEO
A. THE NIEO
In recent years, the less-developed countries of the
world have been calling for a "New International Economic
Order". One noted Third World economist has said that what
these countries are really seeking is "greater equality of
opportunity in the future, which is impossible to achieve
within the present economic imbalances and the existing
world structures which favor the rich nations". He cites
the international credit system as an example: "poor
nations, with 70% of the world population, have received
less than 4% of the international credit of $126 billion in
the last two decades" [Ref. 3: p. 2].
B. THE OS AND THE THIRD WORLD
Members of the Third World have turned for cooperation
and help to the advanced industrial powers, and especially
to the Onited States. In the past O.S. assistance programs
have not had the effects intended and Third World Countries
have not taken steps for real development-to reform the use
and control of land, to promote investment, to reform their
bureaucracies, or to control growth of their populations.
Even though the Third World is heavily dependent on the
Onited States and will be increasingly so-especially for
food- the Onited States also has a large and growing
interest in cooperative relations with the Third World. To
state a few of the more evident reasons:
1. The Onited States is now importing over 30% of its
oil needs from the Third World; and this requirement
will probably go higher.
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2. D.S. industry is almost wholly dependent on foreign
sources of chromium, cobalt, bauxite, manganese, and
tin. Between 40% and 95% of these imported minerals
are from the Third World.
3. The developing countries are increasingly important
as markets for exports. In 1979 26% of U.S. manufac-
tured exports went to the non-oil developing coun-
tries. These export markets in the developing world
are estimated to maintain about one out of every 20
jobs in the manufacturing sector of the U.S economy.
4. Trade with the Third World helps in the fight against
inflation. For example, a recent analysis based on a
survey of actual retail sales in the U.S. found that
imports from the developing countries were as much as
16.3% cheaper than similar goods produced in the U.S.
In contrast, imports from developed countries were
only 0.5% cheaper than American products. This saves
U.S. consumers more than $2 billion a year. It is
estimated that for low income groups this is a
savings of 13% by purchasing goods made in developing
countries rather than in the U.S.
5. Half of total U.S. bank loans to foreign borrowers
go to the Third World.
6. Economic growth in the lass-developed countries
(LDCs) is expected to have a siginificant positive
impact on the growth rates of the developed coun-
tries. The total demand of the LDCs was important in
maintaining the production level of goods and
services in the U.S. during the 1974-75 recession.
7. Relatively prosperous LDCs ar= more likely to experi-
ence political and economic stability that would
benefit U.S. economic and security interest.
16

8. Mors rapid development of certain LDCs could lessen
the pressure for emigration by providing employment,
opportunities in those countries.
9. About one-third of American exports already go to the
less-developed countries. With further development,
these same countries could provide a considerably
larger market. Most economists seem to believe that
advantages to the global economy from increased trade
wculd be great.
10. The original value of American private direct invest-
ments in the Third World is over $30 billion, and
market value is perhaps double that. Earnings from
these investments amount to about 5% of total U.S
corporate profits.
11. Cooperative relations with the Third World is essen-
tial if we are to cope with such global concerns such
as drugs, disease, law-of-the-sea, population, envi-
ronment, terrorism, and possible nuclear thefts.
[Ref. 4]
The philosophy of the NEIO was first set forth in a
"Declaration" and then in a "Program of Action" (both
adopted by the tJN on May 1, 1974) . The new order was to
"redress existing injustices" and make possible the elimina-
tion of the widening gap between the developed and the
developing countries. These two resolutions were soon
followed by a "Charter of Economic: Rights and Duties of
States". The issues dealt with the following: (1)
Expropriations of foreign industrial property without due
regard for international law on compensation; (2) the
encouragement of "producer associations"; (3) establishment
of export and import of developing countries" (4) The
Charter acknowledged that "responsibility for the develop-
ment of every country rests primarily on itself"; (5) The
17

Declaration acknowledged a "close interdependence between
prosperity of the developed and the growth and the develop-
ment of the developing countries"; and (6) The Charter
called for "higher standards of living for all peoples," not
just those of the less-developed countries. [Ref. 5]
C. PAST OS POLICIES TOWARD THE SOOTH
By the mid-1960s the United States in addition to having
supported the goal of independence for many of the devel-
oping countries had provided large amounts of public and
private capital. Also, the American role as champion of
development assistance seemed to meet with wide approval at
home and abroad.
The decade of the sixties was one of considerable
progress for the less-developed countries: with rapidly
rising exports, they collectively increased their real
national product much faster than the industrial countries
had done at a comparable stage in their own history.
However, gradually there were second thoughts about bila-
teral aid on both sides. Some of the LDCs complained that
it involved too much interference in their economic policy
decisions, it was politically motivated, it was insuffi-
cient, it was unpredictable and it enriched a few but not
much trickled down to the mass of people.
In the U.S. view the program was sometimes mismanaged or
corrupt and gained little appreciation. Over time, the
events of Vietnam, the recession of 1973, and the oil crisis
all had a bearing on American attitudes toward the cost of
foreign involvement and thus toward foreign aid.
In view of the disappointing results obtained from U.S.
aid program O.S. aid,. placing major emphasis on the poor
countries. Some other developed countries began to follow a




D. THE OS VIEW OP THE THIRD WORLD TODAY
Today although there have been increasing aid flows to
the poorer LDCs from lembers of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) , the largest aramounts
continue to be provided by the industrial powers. [Ref. 6:
p, 11] The industrial powers have been providing official
development assistance rather than private capital, which
they have furnished in large amounts. The developed coun-
tries have furnished about $12 billion per year-of which the
U.S. contributes about $4 billion. [Ref. 7: p. 12]
Believing that there will not be any sizable increase in
aid in the near future the LDCs have looked more and more
fcr other ways to increase the flow of resources to
promote their development. The U.S. has urged LDCs to look
more to private capital markets, and to taka steps that
encourage foreign investments. The LDCs in turn have been
seeking new preferential trade arrangements and special
trade advantages for their raw materials or commodities in
which they want a higher return on than market prices have
provided.
Industrial nations want to promote mutually beneficial
change while preserving the fundamentals of a system they
believe has served the interest of all countries. The
industrial nations believe the system has responded flexibly
over the last three decades to major global changes-in-
cluding the growing economic and political importance of the
developing countries. The U.S. favors continued evolution
of this system. Sudden changes in the rules for investment
and financial transactions, or massive shifts in trade
patterns, prevents overall economic activity. The U.S.
wants an international system that promotes efficient use of
the world's resources and provides the stability required
for trade and financial transactions. Thus, the U.S.
19

supports basically open trade and free capital flows.
Change must be at a rate that can be absorbed without undue
dislocation. [ Ref . 8: p. 1]
The U.S. believes that increased trade is an important
force in promoting the economic growth for the less devel-
oped countries. For most LDCs, trade rather than offical
aid is the main source of foreign exchange and the primary
external factor in economic progress. The ability of the
LDCs to buy from the advanced countries the goods they need
for their development is dependent to a large extent on
expanding their exports. The U.S. and other developed coun-
tries have instituted a temporary generalized system of
preferences (GSP) for LDCS to encourage development of
exports of manufactures. The U.S. GSP allows specific LDC
products to enter the U.S. duty-free. In 1980, $7.3 billion
worth of LDC exports entered the U.S. under this program.
[Ref. 9: p. 1]
There are many points of differences between developed
countries and the Third World, however, the climate for
addressing these differences are favorable. In many ways
the industrial nations and LDCs find themselves in a state
of mutual economic dependency. The U.S. stake in the Third
World is growing, and the leverage of the Third World is
growing, and as a result, the ability of the Third World to
affect the U.S. is growing. It seems the U.S. and other
developed countries understand these facts and are formu-
lating policy accordingly.
E. GERMAN THIRD WORLD POLICY IN THE NIEO
The debate on the idea of a "new international economic
order" became a central theme of world diplomacy in the
mid-1970s with the U.S and FRG being major actors. In
debates in the UN's seventh Special Assembly in September
20

1975, in the fourth UNCTAD Conference in Nairobi in June
1976, in the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation which lasted from the end of 1975 until June
1977, and Cancun in 1981 the views of the U.S. and FRG
received much attention.
In the 1970s the FRG and the U.S. began to disagree on
issues cf North-South economic relations. The Conference on
International Economic Cooperation, in which representatives
of "have" and "have-not" nations tried to reach a common
position, met in 1976 and then waited to see what view a new
American administration would take. President Carter's
position turned out to be distinctly opposed to that taken
by the FRG.
The FRG argued strongly against international economic
planning and the provision of large buffer stocks of raw
materials, on the grounds that such actions would distort
the operation of world market forces, the Carter administra-
tion liked the idea of buffer stocks and international plan-
ning of raw material markets. (Ref. 10]
The most striking feature of the German position on the
major issues of North-South economic relations-and in parti-
cular en the question of the management of trade in raw
materials sold by poorer producing countries to the indus-
trialized nations of the Northern Hemisphere- is the sharp
conflict which has emerged between the strong laissez-faire
economic principles of the Germans and the commitment of
almost all their partners to some degree of international
economic planning. In every conference in which the
North-South dialogue has been discussed the FRG has been
relatively isolated in opposition to demands from devel-
oping countries, and also to the views of Germany's western
partners including the U.S. on the subjects of international
planning and financing of raw materials stocks.
21

Part of the conflict of views and policies is due to th a
suddenness with which the industrial countries had to face
the challenge of the raw material producer's demand for a
new deal after the Middle Eastern oil revolution of 1973.
The rapid development of the oil producing countries'
demands in UNCTAD, and their bargaining power as a united
bloc, forced the industrial countries of the West to adopt
positions that in most cases reflect their national and
ideological assumptions about economic policy, rather than
positions that were well thought out.
A historical look at actual policies pursued with
respect to the Third World shows some persistent patterns.
In his first message as head of government, Konrad Adenauer
set the tone when he addressed non East-West problems. "The
development and the freedom of international trade is the
subject of our special attention. [Ref. 11: p. 183].
An independent foreign policy in the formal sense did
not start before the mid-1950s, when the FRG became a sover-
eign state. Its foreign policy toward the Third World was
slow to develop in the fifties, and sixties. The Federal
Diet programmed a limited amount of development aid in 1956.
The first piece of legislation setting guidelines for a
development policy was not enacted before 1960. The first
comprehensive debate about Third World policies was
conducted in Parliament in May 1961. The head of the trade
policy section in the Foreign Ministry defined the motives
of German Third World Politics in 1965 to be:
1. humanitarian motives, in order to mitigate the misery
in many countries;
2. economic motives, because only economically strong
countries would provide for meaningful markets,
sufficient supplies and investment opportunities:
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3. finally, motives of national policy. [ Ref . 12: p.
183]
Despite the first priority being given to the humanita-
rian motive, the second dominated relations with the Third
World. Humanitarian aid program with first priority would
have focussed on the poverty-stricken countries or least
developed countries, and would have largely supported food
aid and disaster relief. None of these programes dominate
in actual West German aid patterns.
There is evidence of some humanitarian aid, but the
commitment of the FRG was strongest to those areas where a
clear cut economic interest could also be gained. The third
motive, mainly the issue of German reunification, played a
role but it is hard to find cases where this priority
contradicted economic interest. On the international level
in the area of production and trade, the FRG has long-
standing priorities, inherited from former political
systems-economic prioities that seem to still be true today.
Africa has played a central role in German policy.
Latin America was for the most part considered the backyard
of the U.S., and in spite of activity on the part of
industry, little political attention was paid, to Latin
America, as indicated by the absence of such things as
military aid programs. Latin America was left to commercial
enterprises until the late sixties when Bonn undertook large
aid programs and political experiments-like training union
officials.
Asia was also less iiportant than Africa. Bonn felt
much more comfortable concentrating on the traditional focus
of German colonial policies, i.e. Africa. The




the comparatively low share of Africa in international trade
(between 5 to 6 percent of imports and exports at this time,
OA) does not reflect the actual importance which the conti-
nent enjoys today, and will enjoy even more so in the
future. Also today Africa plays an important role with a
variety of crops in production and export... in another area,
Africa is about to become one of the most important partners
of the world: in the production of minerals. Numerous
stocks, partially rich in potential, are known. [Ref. 13:
p. 184] The Afrika-Verein quotes known reserves as: being
very vast in chromium, bauxite, diamonds, iron ore, gold,
cobalt, copper, mangan, platin; being vast in asbestos,
beryllium, lead, columbita, natural gas, petrol, glimmer,
graphite, uranium, vanadium, vermiculite; being average in
antimonium, barite, cadmium, fluorite, silver, titanium,
tin; and being small in coal, molybdenum, nickel, sulphur,
tungsten, zinc. [Ref. 14]
Post-war Germany developed close relations with southern
Africa where there were already many German links both with
the Republic of South Africa and with South West Africa
(Namibia). The former country had been partly settled by
Europeans of German origin (these accounted for as much as
28 percent of the white population), and the latter terri-
tory had been a German colony from 1885 to 19 19, before
passing under a South African mandate, later revoked by the
United Nations (UN) . Southern Africa continued from the
fifties onward to be an important area for German trade and
investment (South Africa in 1973 provided the FRG with 54
percent of its manganese, 48 percent of its copper, and 29
percent of its chromium. [Ref. 15: p. 61] In 1980 Germany
was 99.8 percent import-dependent in copper, 93 percent in
iron, 87 percent in lead, and 68 percent in zinc. And
Germany has been stockpiling such critical ores as chromity,
cobalt, and manganese. [Ref. 16]
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When Germany became a sovereign international actor in
the mid-fifties the overriding principle was
Deutschlandpolitik (German politics) rather ^han
Aussenpolitik (foreign politics) -Germany tried to do every-
thing possible to hold back the influence of the German
Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) in order to
preserve the FRG's claim to speak for Germany as a whole.
The so-called "Hallstein Doctrine", proclaimed by Bonn
in the late fifties when both German states were beginning
to develop more active policies of trade, aid, and diplo-
matic relations, stated that the FRG had the right of sole
representation of the German nation. The doctrine laid down
the rule that no state, with the exception of the Soviet
Union, could be permitted to maintain diplomatic relations
with Bonn as well as the GDR, and if a state established
relations with the GDR, the FRG would automaticly break all
relations -- including the elgebility of economic aid, tech-
nical assistance, and diplomatic representation.
This policy was not popular among Third World countries.
However, the FRG was not alone in the use of such policy.
The U.S. has repeatedly used this type of policy as a tool
to oppose regimes which came to power after liberation wars,
most notably China. The GDR was, at least in the views of
the more Moscow - oriented Third World governments, a state
which emerged from a social revolution, and the withholding
of recognition as a measure of discrimination, punishment
and isolation was easily compared with cases when the
Western powers treated some revolutionary Third World
governments in exactly the same manner.
The Hallstein Doctrine collapsed in the Third World in
1965/66 when Tanganyika (a supporter of the West) and
Zanzibar (with a Consulate General of the GDR) united to
form Tanzania, and the Head of State wouldn't annoy the East
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Germans by closing -the consulate. Bonn stopped all military
and some economic aid. In the Middle East Bonn's relations
with Arab nations went bad with their support of Israel with
military deliveries and Ulbricht (GDR Head of State) touring
Egypt on a state visit. Arab governments copied Bonn's
strategy and threatened to apply a reverse Hallstein
Doctrine by severing diplomatic relations with the FRG if
there was an exchange of ambassadors between West Germany
and Israel. The next few years saw a determined effort by
Bonn to contain the recognition of East Germany, but after
Ostpolitik in 1969, thera was a wave of diplomatic recogni-
tions, and since then the issue has been dead. In the Yom
Kippur War of 1973, Bonn's unwillingness to compromise a
fragile relationship with the Arab world led to a sharp
clash between the FRG and the U.S., which used its facili-
ties in West Germany to supply military support to Israel.
Germany's policy in respect to the export of arms and
weapon systems in the fifties through the early 1970s was
one of "not willing to act as the substitute of the sales-
mangers of German arms industries." [Ref. 17: p. 186] After
1974 the policy was one of only exporting arms to NATO coun-
tries. [Ref. 18: p. 187]
Soon after the price hike of crude oil in 1973 and the
economic depression the FRG had second thoughts on its arms
control policy and changed its restrictive policy.
Commercial sales of German weapons developed from $100
million in 1969 to $1 Billion in 1977 [Ref. 19: p. 188]
according to figures from the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, the export to Third World countries rose
to $150 million in the same time period. Prior to the Shah
of Iran's abdication in early 1979, orders placed with the
German armament industry were valued at DM 1 billion, an
amount comoarable with the French and the British.
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The redirection of policy was the most dramatic in arms
exports but other fields which were much more relevant to
the German economic system quickly followed suit. The
nuclear industry, another good example of sophisticated
technology, fits the pattern. The commercial interest
involved in the transfer of nuclear power stations is higher
than in the case of arms sales: at a unit cost of DM 5
billion each individual sale creates six thousand jobs for
six years. The German nuclear industry for many years paid
a high cost for its technology at the same time lacking the
export profits which other competitors were enjoying.
[Ref. 20] In the mid- seventies the nuclear industry reached
a point of non-profitability: "In order to use existing
capacities economically, under given contract volumes the
sole of six power station units per annum is mandatory...."
[Ref. 21] export sales manager Hildenbrand states.
Germany accepted power station orders from Brazil (which
caused a sharp conflict with the U.S.) and Iran, and
expected orders for eight more annually, four of them for
export. Then environmentalists brought construction work
for nearly all nuclear power stations to a halt in the FRG
and the biggest firm in the business, Draftwerksunion didn't
receive an order for four years. This caused pressures on
the government to go into export of nuclear power stations
to mount. In 1979 with eight nuclear power stations
contracted to Germany, the Shah left Iran, leaving DM 5
billion worth of uncompleted facilities. This was a big
shock to Germany's nuclear industry, which was unable to get
other nuclear power stations export orders during the late
seventies. There was some demand in the Soviet Union and
South Africa- this left the industry in a position of
fighting for survival and not wanting to go through another
international storm such as in the nuclear deal with Brazil.
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This picture could be drawn in nearly the same way for
other German industries such as steel, ship-building, compu-
ters, heavy engineering eguipment, to name a few which have
suffered much from a combined impact of a shrinking home
market and the high cost of the mark. For foreign economic
policies, room for purely political considerations is
dramatically reduced, and diplomats hardly have a choice
other than support of German firms who fight for survival
in the world markets.
It seems that pressures from vital economic interests
play a big role in shaping the actual outcome of Bonn's
Third World policies, especially the vulnerability of West
German on imports of vital raw materials. This fact makes
it essential for the FRG to build relations with suppliers
outside the industrialized world. Africa with its rich
resources becomes a focus of interest. When seen in this
respect, it is obvious why Africa receives the largest
amount of German development aid. (See Table I) . Today
German Third World policies are more or less equivalent to
earlier patterns-that of a mix of industrial interest based
on an effort to lure Third World countries into a convenient
relationship which is much like the one that contributed
much to the rise of the colonial powers of Western Europe
in earlier times.
F. THE OS AND FHG IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN
AFRICA
Before examining how a. S. and the FRG view conflicts it
is necessary to briefly put their roles in Africa in
perspective. Africa is an ideal area to compare U.S. and
FRG policy toward the Third World because the Germans view
Africa as the centerpiece of their Third World policy and




In general the great majority of states in Sub-Sahara
Africa achieved their independence from Europeans through a
peaceful transfer of authority beginning in the late 1950s
and earily 1960s. Even so, European presence and policy has
continued to be the principle instrument of western interest
in Africa. However, during the last few years Africa has
created increasingly important policy choices for the U.S.:
how to bring about peaceful change in South Africa, how to
decrease massive human suffering, how to strengthen the
political economies of African states, how to respond to the
invasion of Gambia, how to deal with Zaire •s corruption and
ineffectiveness, and the question of how much support for
the Angolan war for independence. From 1960 to 1974 the
U.S. and the USSR were directing their attention to other
areas of the world and a favorable international climate
existed. Neither the U.S. or USSR sent heavy military
equipment to the area. The U.S. gave Africa low priority
and depended upon the Europeans to maintain Western interest
there.
Since 1974 the picture has changed. Liberation move-
ments have gained power with substantial Soviet support.
The Soviets established a major presence in the Horn of
Africa and begain to send heavy arms to Sub-Sahara Africa.
Angola and Ethiopia received large amount equipment. Since
1974 the USSR has directly challenged U.S. and Europe inter-
ests in Africa, thus making it a more important part of
foreign policy and creating a new environment.
The tension in the area is increased by U.S. and Western
reliance on southern African minerals: Zaire's copper and
cobalt; Zambia's copper; Zimbabwe's chrome; Angola's oil;
Namibia's uranium; and South Africa's chromium, maganese and
platinum group metals. The situation is even more compli-
cated by the South African's commitment to apartheid and its
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Figure 2. 1 Nations of Africa
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military and economic strength and ability to project this
strength in southern Africa. Also, many Africans associate
Western economic presence in South Africa as support for its
government, making a peaceful and orderly transition to
majority rule there an important issue to all Africa.
These problems are further influenced by underlying
conditions such as, economic, political and military infras-
tructure deficiencies in a majority of African states.
Africa is the most vulnerable contineat. Two-thirds of the
poorest LDCs are Africans; among them there was practically
no economic growth during the 1970s and little is predicted
for the 1980s, and famine and refugee populations have
greatly risen since the mid-1970s. The poverty of many of
these countries is incredibly poor and the outlook was
further darkened by the 1979-80 OPEC oil price hikes. The
many armed conflicts and military coups have derived from
these poor conditions. The new environment, the increased
reliance on African minerals, the intensification of
southern African confict, and continuing infrastructure
deficiencies in the political economies of Africa together
present increasingly difficult choices for the U.S. and
Germany.
G. WEST GERMANY'S FORMULATION OF AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY
TODAY
West German foreign policy is typically formulated with
close reference to the European Community policies and those
of the United States. Policy towards Africa takes place
within this framework and may be characterized as
"cooperative pragmatic"; neither leading nor standing alone
on issues ncr bound by "special relationships" but asserting
and expanding interests in a manner designed to give maximum
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benefit to the German economy. Since 1978 there has been a
trend towards a more pronounced involvement and quietly
assertive policy in southern Africa which comes from a
conviction that West Germany* s economy is significantly
reliant upon the region's minerals. There is also greater
awareness of Africa in Germany; for example, the 1980
Frankfurt Book Fair had as its theme "Africa: A Continent
Asserts its Identity" with 35 African authors and journal-
ists present and 2500 African works on exhibit. [Ref. 22:
p. 61] increasing across the board, a defined policy is
taking shape in the related but distinct areas of political,
economic and security relationships and with respect to
South Africa and Namibia.
1 • Political Relations hips
The basis of German policy was outlined in speeches
that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt made in Nigeria and Zambia in
1978 during the first offical state visit by a German chief
of state to black Africa. Schmidt asserted that Germany
wanted to see "an Africa undergoing steady economic and
social development on a basis of political stability."
[Ref. 23: p. 82] A prime principle of policy is recognition
of the OA0 principle of incontestable boundaries and the
support of an Africa of Africans with African solutions.
European political considerations, particularly East
German considerations, are an important element of policy.
[Ref. 24: p. 93] Ostpolitik modified the Hallstein Doctrine
but the expanded role of East Germany in Africa since the
mid-1970s has caused particular concern in West Germany. Of
considerable signific ance is West Germany*s inability to
conclude aid and trade agreements with Angola and
Mozambique. The latter are signatories of Friendship
Treaties with the Soviet Union and are not willing to accept
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provisions in agreements with West Germany-the so-called
"Berlin clause"- by which the provisions of the agreements
are extended to West Berlin.
2 . Economic Relations
Europe and Africa are viewed by Germans as natural
economic partners and policy is designed to help Africa
become a stronger partner through an increased transfer of
real resources and technology and the encouragment of
private investment. The government believes that the basic
economic questions with which it is faced-economic growth,
monetary stability and unemployment -- directly affect the
LDCs and that growth in the industrialized countries is the
major prerequisite for Third World development.
Africa is viewed as the centerpiece of the
North-South relationship with the Lome Convention being one
of the principal expressions of policy. Germany is a major
aid donor, contributing 28 percent of EC and 11 percent of
World Bank aid to Africa and is increasing its own aid
budget for Africa 23 percent a year through 1983. Germany
is the only major aid donor which does not tie aid to
purchase of national products, believing that its products
are competitive. There is widespread public support for
economic assistance which has been present for years as
being in German interests.
Germany is a stronger advocate of free trade than
its British or French partners who sometimes promote protec-
tive quotas. Germany favored a STA3EX formula in Lome
rather than international commodity agreements, believing
the latter produce distortions in markets rather than stabi-
lize secular trends. [Ref, 25: p. 63]
There is little direct German investment in black
Africa; with only Nigeria holding more than $100 million.
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Germany has a $350 million direct investment in South Africa
and its private banks are major creditors there.
3. Securit y Rela tions
Germany's principal security interests in Africa are
(1) assured long-term access to sil and minerals, (2)
support for more fully independent states, and (3) crisis
avoidance. The Germans see a region of somewhat fragile and
unstable states which should be strengthened economically in
order to function more effectively in what is now a fully
integrated world economy. Existing weaknesses are agitated
by the Russian-Cuban- East German presence and there is the
danger that regional crisis could blow up into a major
crisis. The preferred instrument for dealing with African
crisis is the OAO which is not viewed as being very effec-
tive but as being the only regional organization with which
to work.
In general, Germany accepts the U.S. security point
of view with respect to Africa; i.e., that the U.S. tends to
examine every issue in terms of the East-West conflict.
However, for Germany, the East-West conflict means Europe
and it treats African issues in a West-South framework.
Germany is closer to its European allies than to the U.S.
with respect to its perception of Soviet influence in
Africa. It believes that the Soviets are losing influence
in Angola, Mozambigue and Benin and that, with patience,
even Ethiopia can be moved out of the Soviet camp. They
note that the Soviets were removed from Egypt and Somalia,
they had made major efforts, and Germany feels that in the
long-term Ethiopia could move back towards the West.
These differences raise the possibility of sharper
divergencies in policy response in the future, particularly
given the new environment in Africa. Although the African
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policies of Germany have not been a subject of great
interest in the past r they may merit more attention in the
future.
H. COMPARISON OF THE OS AMD FRG FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE
THIRD WORLD, AS SEEN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
The U.S. and the FRG share two basic interests in
Africa. First, there is a common interest in access to
minerals and markets; southern African minerals are vital to
Germany and important to the United States. Second, the
U.S. and the FRG wish to be able to deny these assets as
well as port facilities and oceanways to the Soviets and
their allies. A third interest is to minimize North-South
conflict and maintain as much support in international
organizations from the African states as possible. These
interests are interrelated.
Within the context of this commonality of interest there
are differences in interpreting what constitutes inst-
ability. For example, some policy makers see Cuban military
forces in Angola as destabilizing while others see them as
stabilizing. There are also differences in priority. As a
global power the U.S. tends zo see issues in an Easr-West
relation while the FRG tends to see East-West issues as the
West meaning Europe; while German relations with Africa are
seen primarily as North-South or West-South issues. The
Germans, in particular, are concerned that a Reagan
Administration overemphasis on the East-West dimension of
African conflict could have a negative effect on arms
control negotiations with the Soviets.
1. Southern Africa; M iner als, Apartheid, In sta bility
Possibly the most prominent African issues directly
challenging the U.S. and Germany are those in southern
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Africa. Here the interest of long-term access to strategic
minerals is related to maintaining a degree of political
stability and pro-western attitudes which are threatened by
contention over apartheid (South Africa), stalled indepen-
dence (Namibia), civil strife (Angola), ethnic hostilities
(Zimbabwe) , and ineffectual government (Zaire) . The
dilemmas they represent apply primarily to African condi-
tions and attitudes. An additional concern is preventing
those conditions and attitudes from being exploited by the
USSR.
African minerals are vital to Western economies.
Most of the Worlds minerals are found in Africa and many
are an important part of world supply, particularly the
energy fuels- oil, coal and uranium - and non-fuel minerals
such as chromium and manganese. The money and technology
are available for expoliting these resources. Therefore,
the real issue is the nature of the regimes which exercise
political control and what this means in terms of issues
ranging from maintaining physical security of supply and
transport to adherence to a market economy philosophy.
The most vital minerals to the U.S. and FRG, in
terms of both use and limited access to other sources, are
found in South Africa. The issue is one of longer term
stability within South Africa rather than investment and
production. South Africa now has one of the world's heal-
thiest minerals industries.
South African apartheid - legal discrimination
against blacks - renders cooperation with and acceptance of
that government difficult for the U.S. and FRG. The U.S.
and FRG seem in agreement that the basic issue facing them
in South Africa is how to bring about change while
preserving their interests. Both countries 1 governments and
business communties view the Afrikaner government as rigid
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and fundamental change ranging from unlikely to uncertain.
They also seem assured that South African security capabili-
ties are adequate to maintain law and order, at least for
the short term, but they further believe that the government
has initiated a policy of some changa.
The basic policy for the U.S. and FRG is to denounce
apartheid, advocate political participation for all, and
promote codes of conduct to enhance black economic opportu-
nity and life. Under President Carter the U.S. differed
from Europe in specifically stating that change would come
and in giving greater emphasis to human rights. The posi-
tion of the Reagan Administration is more similar to the
Germans who are explicit about dealing with the government
in power. The Reagan Administration has moved the U.S
closer to South Africa, however, with its policy of
"constructive engagement" and a desire to end South Africa f 3
oppressed class status and resume friendly relations.
[Ref. 26: p. 79]
There are some differences in approach. 3asically,
the Germans, place heavy smphasis on "contact and dialogue."
Economic sanctions are viewed as bad policy and unlikely to
be effective; however they indicate that time is running out
in South Africa and pressures for change must be maintained.
[Ref. 27]
2 . Nam ibia
Namibia, which is a major producer of uranium and
industrial diamons, is a UN mandated territory administered
by South Africa in violation of the JN mandate. In 1977 the
U.S., France, Germany, the UK, and Canada, formed a
"contact group" for the purpose of reaching an agreement to
hold elections and grant independence to Namibia under UN
supervision. south Africa agreed "in principle" to a
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contact group plan submitted to the ON Security Council
which, in the form cf Resolution 435, created the means to
carry out elections in Namibia. South Africa has refused to
implement Resolution 435, most recently in a January 1981
conference in Geneva, where, it stated that there was inade-
quate trust between the different parties and ethnic groups
in the territory to reach a sound political solution.
Before the January 1981 meeting it was widely
believed that the African states would call for mandatory
sanctions at the ON if South Africa did not agree to imple-
ment the ON resolution. The O.S. and European governments
hoped this would not occur, reflecting their belief that
South Africa cannot be pressured on this issue. The Western
governments believe that progress did take place at the
meeting in January; saying Namibian parties met face to face
for the first time and a number of private meetings were
held between people who were sworn enemies. The West also
felt that some African states had cone to accept their posi-
tion of working quietly for greater understanding.
The Western governments failed, however, to persuade
the Africans and Third World states not to force a vote on
sanctions in the ON Security Council. Votes on breaking
diplomatic relations with South Africa, imposing an oil
embargo and economic sanctions and setting up machinery to
enforce these measures were all vetoed by the O.S. but not
the FRG. The contact group continues to pursue negotiations
with South Africa but with little evidence of progress.
3 • Pol icy Approaches
The O.S. and FRG have distinct national interests
and different approaches which permit a flexibility which
can be beneficial. The pressures created by South Africa
may also lead to differences in approach. For example, the
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Reagan Administration and the major governments in Europe
are in close consultation on policy towards southern Africa
but West Germany, in particular, has expressed some concern
that the U.S. may be reluctant to diligently pursue the
South Africans in order to achieve a negotiated settlement
on Namibia. [Ref. 28]
4 . Co unter ing The Soviet Threat
The primary issue currently agitating discussion in
Germany and the U.S. is the Reagan Administrations avowed
determination to challenge the Soviet presence in Africa.
Currently, that presence is primarily Cuban- 19,000 troops
and advisors in Angola, 17,000 in Ethiopia, 1500 in
Mozambique, and a few hundred in other countries- backed by
Russian equipment, weapons, and advisors. To these force
levels, which have remained fairly constant for approxi-
mately five years, might be added 8,000 Libyan troops-seen
by many as Soviet proxies, some of whom moved into Chad in
198 1. In addition, there are a few thousand East European,
mostly German, and some North Korean advisors in various
African countries. The Reagan Administration has emphasized
that African policy is one component of the overriding
concern with East-West relations. Germany is concerned
about the Reagan African policy. In the first days of his
administration The German Foreign Minister Genscher visited
Washington and urged that the U.S. use discretion in its
response to Communist forces in Africa. They stressed the
importance of not moving too far from the African consensus,
which is tired of East-West confrontation in Africa, and
have sought to impress upon the Reagan Administration the
importance of maintaining pressure on South Africa with
respect to Namibia. [Ref. 29]
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Germany plays a limited security role in Africa
supplying security related equipment to key African coun-
tries. The Reagan Administration is increasing the U.S.
effort in promoting internal stability in Africa through an
increase in Economic Support Funds for national security.
The budget for this item has increased from $144.5 million
in FY 81 to $231 million in FY82 and the Administration has
stated that it may ask for further increases. It has also
pledged $585 million granted to Africa for emergency refugee
assistance: an action which is seen primarily as humanita-
rian but which also has an important security dimension.
5 • Ec ono mic And Develo omen t Issues
Basic to successfully addressing the issues
described above is the ec cnomic relationship between the
U.S. and FRG and Africa. Africa is the only continent in
the world which experienced a per capita decline in food
production over the past two decades. It new has the
largest number of refugees of any continent as well as the
highest rate of population growth. These combine with
ethnic differences and increased energy costs to place great
strain on the social condition. There is general agreement
by the U.S. and FP.G that preservation and promotion cf its
economic and security interests in Africa will require a
more sound economic climate in these societies. Trade and
investment are necessary but insufficient tools to achieve
this. Foreign assistance is essential but who the reci-
pients should be and the level and type of assitance they
need are issues.
There is competition for Africa's expanding markets
but this is the norm for free market economies. The U.S.
and Germany, concerned about their balance of payments and
sagging economies, are becoming more competitive in seeking
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out this market. However the Germans have become the second
most important trading partner in most African states.
Increased competition for markets is supported by
government trade finance support agancies. With domestic
double digit inflation these agencies now lend to foreign
importers at lower rates than they pay for funds in their
domestic markets. The U.S. and the FRG have sought an
international agreement to prohibit loans at less than
domestic rates. The U.S. and the FRG will probably continue
to compete for overseas markets and make government policies
with respect to their trade support agencies as an issue.
Basically, the U.S. and the FRG have few differences
in their approach to economic relations with Africa. The
problems arise in development; the Development Decade of
the 1970s produced minimal economic growth in Africa and
projections for the 1980s are equally poor. While there are
some differences of approach or emphasis by the U.S. and the
FRG the fundamental problem is putting adequate resources
into the continent to protect and promote their interests.
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III. US AND FRG FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY TOWARD THIRD WORLD
CONFLICT: EL SALVADOR & SOOTH AFRICA/NAMIBIA
A. OS FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY
The Reagan administration's foreign policy is simple and
direct. The major theme is anti-Soviatisra [Ref. 30. p. 9.].
Every problem on the international scene is viewed in terms
of the Soviet challenge. The Soviet Onion as the main
global danger to O.S. interests has been a major theme of
the Reagan administration's foreign policy. President
Reagan's foreign policy emphasises that the Soviet Onion is
directly or indirectly related to all the unrest that is
going on - racism in South Africa, struggles in the Middle
East, and revolution in Central America. President Reagan
denounced the OSSR at his first prass conference in January
198 1 and amplified his charges in a nationally televised
interview in aarch of that year. Sacretary of state Haig
emphasized the Soviat danger in his first speech after
taking office. [Ref. 31]
B. THE OS AND FRG PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT IN AFRICA
The Onited States and Germany have similar interests and
goals in Africa, but thare are real differences in their
respective positions in the global political economy, both
with respect to Africa and to the Soviet Onion, and in the
perceptions of Soviet motives and capabilities with respect
to Africa.
Both the Europeans and the O.S. are fully aware of
Soviet eagerness to meddle in Africa, but the FRG tends to
believe that this is made possible more by conditions in
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Africa than by an aggressive grand design on the part of the
Soviets. Africa is seen as being in a state of prolonged
crisis; infrastructural deficiencies, ideological differ-
ences, persisting spheres of influence, national boun-
daries which cut across traditional polities, the incomplete
process of decolonization, and a widening economic gap
between mineral rich African states able to sustain economic
growth and the many other countries with no growth and
severe balance of payments problems are the causes of poli-
tical insecurity and instability. Germans recognize that
these conditions provide opportunities for Soviet penetra-
tion but believe it important that the West not over-react
to Soviet advances nor see Soviet gains as necessarily
long-term. Germany believes that the Soviets are not
willing to directly challenge the West in Africa, and one
European analyst concluded that "nowhere in Africa has the
influence of the major Western powers been decisively chal-
lenged in an area where their interests are historically
rooted and of perceived importance to their current economic
welfare." [Ref. 32: p, 358]
The O.S. views the Soviet willingness to interpose them-
selves in Africa as an aggressive grand design with severe
implications. The Reagan administration generally accepts
the view of Soviet policy presented views in a recent book
(The Next War) by former President Richard Nixon. Nixon
asserts that Africa and the Third World countries are an
immediate target of the Soviet Union because it believes
that it can gain strategic advantages and place itself
increasingly in a position to control the world's resources
and lifelines at relatively little risk and cost. He states
the Soviets want southern Africa and in the larger world
struggle southern Africa is a key battleground as vital as
the Middle East. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, prior
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to his appointment, urged that NATO be informally extended
to cover southern Africa, which contains minerals vital to
Western security. President Reagan's assistant Secretary of
State for Africa, Chester Crocker, has said that "Africa
cannot be isolated from the global conflict". [Ref. 33]
Africa is not the highest priority in foreign policy issue
but it assumes significance in that it is seen as an indi-
cator of Soviet intentions in the world.
Other factors also influence U.S. and German policies
towards Africa. Because of the German colonial experience,
political and cultural ties exist between the two continents
and particularly for Germany, Africa is an area of some
priority, where economic interests and ties are dominant and
is some cases vital. For the United States, economic rela-
tions with Africa are less important than strategic/poli-
tical concerns. As a rival superpower, the U.S. is
particularly concerned with Soviet activity anywhere in the
world. Germany, being closer to the Soviet Union and more
reliant on Soviet energy supplies, finds itself more
constrained in talcing a hostile stance vis-a-vis the Soviets
than does the U.S.
These differences are important, but, they are only
differences of degree and both the U.S. and Germany, in
terms of interests, perceptions and goals, see their roles
in Africa as being more-or-less complementary. However, the
new environment and the emergence of southern Africa as an
issue not only raises the level of concern about interests
in Africa but also increases the possibility of differences
of approach.
The key issues for the U.S. and Germany in Africa are a
function of basic interests: access to minerals, denial of
assets to the Soviets, encouragement of economic development
and political stability. While the interests seem clear-cut
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they sometimes overlap and conflict with each other. For
example, access to minerals has required an acceptable
working relationship with South Africa which some see as
jeopardizing O.S. access to Nigerian oil. This may prevent
good working relationships with other African mineral
producing states and it conflicts with the U.S. desire to
deny Soviet influence. It is not chance-but rather Soviet
support for opponents of European colonial rule and apar-
theid-that three states which border South Africa and
Namibia are now presided over by self-styled Marxists.
It is Soviet presence and white supremacist government
which creates and gives force to two major issues faced by
the O.S. and FRG in Africa. Thus, two key questions for
policy makers are:
1. How to promote political change in South Africa in
such a way that economic and strategic interests will
be maintained?
2. Hew to deny African assets to the Soviet bloc?
A third fundamental question-How best to strengthen the
political economies of black African states?-comes from the
important role they play in an integrated world economy and
in international organizations as well as the wish to deny
Soviet influence and avoid crisis.
Although the U.S. and the FRG define their interests and
goals in a similar manner, they differ on which issues have
priority. The Germans place greatest emphasis on regime
support in black Africa believing that, combined with even-
tual change in South Africa and patient diplomacy, the
African states can be taken away from Soviet influence. In
contrast, the Reagan Administration has given highest
priority to a denial of Soviet bloc presence, has rejected
the notion of placing overt pressure for change on South
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Africa, ana states that in the future foreign aid will be
determined in part by how states vote at the UN. [Ref. 34:
P. 11]
Namibia will be discussed in more detail in section D.5
but this is one country of importance where the U.S. and the
FRG tend to agree on policy but where there is a potential
for differences. Namibia is an issue upon which the U.S.
and Germany worked closely and actively for four years but
here there are indications that their cooperation may be
disintegrating. The Reagan Administration has given the
goal of independence for Namibia some priority in its
African policy but has implied that if an agreement cannot
be reached, the U.S. will not expend its resources on the
matter. The issue will not go away however; it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. to walk away from
this issue. A reduction in U.S. efforts to achieve a
settlement in Namibia would put the U.S. in disagreement
with the policies of the FRG. The Germans, believe it is
important to make sure a united effort on Namibia be main-
tained.
C. US AND FRG STRATEGY FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA
1 • The US And Southern A frica in Genera l
U.S. regional strategy for southern Africa in
general is based on three basic realities, U.S. economic
interest, U.S. national security interest, and political
interest. First, U.S. economic interest in Sub-Saharan
Africa are heavily concentrated in the southern third of the
continent. Nearly $3 billion of direct investment, or about
60^ of the sub-Saharan total, is located there. U.S.
southern African trade totals over $6 billion. This concen-
tration of interest reflects southern Africa*s tremendous
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mineral wealth and the relative sophistication of the area's
economies- especially those of South Africa and Zimbabwe.
Southern Africa accounts for ovsr 40% of sub-Saharan
Africa's GNP, 70% of its industrial and 60% of its mining
output, 80% of the steel and 85% of the electricity
consumed. The area contains immense deposits of many
strategic minerals which are vital to industrial economies
like the U.S., including: the platinum group (86% of world
reserves), Manganese (53%), Vanadium (64%), Chromium (95%),
and colbolt (53%) , as well as a dominant share of coal,
uranium, copper, and other minerals. Many of these, minerls
are vital to western defense and high technology industry.
There is no longer much debate about southern
Africa's economic significance. With regional stability the
area can prosper and serve as a basis for African economic
progress. Trade and private investment flows from the U.S.
and other Western nations can reinforce this protential and
provide a solid basis of mutual interest for U.S. - African
relations. If there is movement toward regional turmoil,
however, southern Africa's economic potential is threatened.
The Reagan administration strongly supports southern African
economic development through encouragement of trade and
investment throughout the area and through the provisions of
timely and carefully tailored foreign assistance. [Ref. 35]
Second, southern Africa has become an increasingly
contested area in world politics. The significance of the
region is derived from its economic potential, and mineral
wealth, and as long as nations cannot resolve their
conflicts without outside intervention this area has become
a boiling pot with mounting East-West tensions. Since
Portugal's departure from its ex-colonies in 1975, the USSR
and its clients have shown every interest in keeping the pot
of regional conflicts boiling. The Warsaw Pact countries
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have arms agreement with four nations of the area and
provide the bulk of external military support to guerrilla
groups aimed at Namibia and South Africa. This is a poten-
tial explosive danger given that U.S. and German interests
are enhanced by southern Africa*s geopolitical importance
along the strategic sea routes around Africa and by its
growing importance as a source of critical minerals. It is
in this context that the O.S. feels it must protect the
region's security and counter the expansion of Soviet influ-
ence. The U.S. policy is to counter any state that tries to
effect political change by military force and in areas of
conflict to build the confidence necessary for equitable and
durable solutions by encouraging the emergence and survival
of genuine democratic systems and productive economies.
Third, the political basis for regional cooperation
is strikingly absent. Racial and ethnic pluralism and colo-
nialism and white minority rule make conflict resolution
between African states difficult. The legally entrenched
apartheid policies of South Africa are anathema to its
neighbors who seek to lessen dependence on South Africa and
increase political pressures for domestic change. The U.S.
will not allow a situation to develop that would degenerate
into destructive revolutionary violence. The low-level
guerrilla conflict over Namibia has become a focal point of
concern. All parties accept the principle of independence,
and some measure of agreement exists about the procedures
for a transfer of power but the talks are stalled. This war
could expand if a settlement is not reached. Thus it is
clear that southern Africa contains within itself the seeds
of growing violence. To prevent this possibility the U.S.




D. CASE STUDY: SOOTH AFRICA/HAMIBIA
1 • The as And South Africa
Relations betweem the United States and South Africa
date back prior to 19 10 and have traditionally been regarded
as peripheral to the vital interest of both countries.
Through most of South Africa's history its external rela-
tions-politically, economically, culturally and militarily-
have been directed toward Europe (particularly Germany, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France) and its immed-
iate African neighbouring territories. The United States
for its part, has long been oblivious to developments on the
African continent. For all pratical purposes, Africa did
not exist as an independent concern of American policy prior
to the Angolan civil war in 1975.
Since World War II, the situation has gradually
changed, for three reasons. First, the emergence of the
U.S. as a superpower and its role as the leader of the free
world. Second, the emergence of black nationalism as
Africa's new states crowded onto the stage of world politics
since post-1960 with the result that today the African
continent accounts for more than a third of the total
membership of the UN. And third, the rise of black cons-
ciousness in the U.S. and its impact on U.S. electoral poli-
tics. Today U.S. policy toward South Africa has changed
from benign neglect to constructive engagement with economic
interaction being the strongest link between the two coun-
tries. This interaction is primarily manifested in the
fields of trade and investments.
2. OS Economic Re lati ons with South Africa
Economic relations are the strongest links between
South Africa and the U.S. These primarily involve the fields
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of trade and investments. The overall trend in the U.S.-
South African trade pattern can be described as a steady
increase in the volume of trade, with the U.S. maintaining
and increasing the trade balance in its favor. (See Table
ID .
South Africa is ranked eighteenth as U.S. export
clients and ranked first as a market for U.S. goods on the
African cointinent. In 1976, U.S. exports to South Africa
reached a peak of $1.3 billion, representing about one-third
of America's exports to Africa, (almost as much as the
combined total of the following four trading partners
Nigeria, Egypt , Algeria and Morocco) , and this produced a
favorable balance of $423 million. In terms of American
global exports. South Africa represents about one percent of
the foreign market for American goods.
From the South African side in 1976 the U.S. was the
fourth largest importer of South Africa's goods, (behind the
UK, Japan and West Germany and was first as supplier of
South African imports (21.4 percent of South African imports
compared to 18.1 percent supplied by West Germany, 17.8
percent supplied by the United Kingdom and 10.3 percent
supplied by Japan) .
Even more important than the volume of U.S. trade
with South Africa, is the growing value of U.S. investments
in South Africa, partly in the form of indirect investment
(loans and equity investment), and partly in the form of
direct investment (ownership).
By the end of 1976, the U.S. percentage of foreign
liabilities was 30 percent. The primary borrowers of inter-
national credit in South Africa are the public corporations
such a ISCOR, the South African Railways and Harbours, the
Department of Posts and Telegraphs, the SABC and the South
African Treasury. The primary U.S. creditors include many
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of the largest international financial institutions: Chase
Manhattan Bank, Citybank, Irving Trust Company, Bank of
America, Central National Bank of Cleveland, Chemical Bank,
Morgan Guarantee, Bank of Boston, Manufactures Hanover
Trust, Wells Fargo Bank, and others.
The book value of American corporate investment in
South Africa by 1976 was $1,665 billion, or 37.3 percent of
total American investment in Africa. Three hundred and
fourty South African firms were American owned, wholly or in
a major part, and the American companies involved repre-
sented a cross section of the biggest in American business.
[Ref. 36]
The Investors Responsability Research Corporation
(IRRC) estimated that U.S. firms eaploy some one hundred
thousand workers in South Africa, 70% of whom are blacks.
[Ref. 37] Ferguson and Cotter, arguing the case for economic
pressure on South Africa, claim that U.S. investment in
South Africa amounts to barely more than one percent of
total private investment overseas and yields about the same
percentage of foreign earning. The point is that losing
U.S. investment in South Africa would do little harm to the
O.S. economy. "South Africa is important, but far from
crucial, for these great corportations. " [Ref. 38]
3 . US Mineral De pen dence on Sout h Africa
The U.S. is dependent on nine especially important
foreign sources of minerals and metals. (see table III).
Projections of these nine materials shows continuing high,
and in some cases an increase in U.S. dependency between
now and the year 2000. [Ref. 39]
The problem is two fold-access to sources of current
production as well as access to sources of reserves for
future production. ( see Figure3.1 & 3.3) The U.S. is a
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major mineral consumer and has a substantial reserve in
copper (18.4%) and tungsten (6.1%) among the nine key
minerals as shown by Figurs 3.2.
The D.S. problem of inadequate reserves is intensi-
fied by the fact that world reserves are highly concentrated
in key areas. Only three countries control over two-thirds
of five of the key minerals: 95.6% of chromium, 90.5% of
manganese, 99.7% of platinum, 74.6% of tungsten, 69.4% of
nickel, and 69% of cobalt. Only two, South Africa and
Rhodesia, have a dominant position with respect to chromium;
another pair, South Africa and the USSR, have the dominance
in platinum and manganese. Figure 3.2 shows that these
three key minerals are dominated by two pairs of suppliers,
the a. S. has extremely high import dependence, 89% for
chromium; 95% for platinum; and 98% for manganese. And
substitution is not likely in the short-term. The lack of
manganese could shut down the U.S. stsel industry. Platinum
and chromium have unique and required character isitics for
particular technological purposes. Chromium is resistant to
corrosion and oxidation and is important for industrial
precision tools. Platinum is an essential element in chem-
ical and petroleum refining. Thus the U.S. is import depen-
dent to high degree on key minerals.
However, import dependence is not necessarily a bad
thing. Dependence suggests that a nation is achieving
certain economic advantages through trade, acquiring
minerals at lower cost by importing, rather than resorting
to higher priced indigenous production or substitution.
Thus, the economic consequence of using cheaper foreign
material is generally strength not weakness. The crucial
assumption is that the minerals are available when needed,
at the right price and quanity. In view of the importance
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potential unstable world situation especially in South
Africa and with the USSR can the O.S. afford this degree of
dependence?
Despite the difficult policy choices which South
Africa 1 s apartheid system reprsents there can be no doubt
about the U.S. dependence on the minerals of the Republic of
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South Africa. Figure 4 demonstrates South Africa's mineral
wealth. Table IVindicated South Africa's high production
and reserve position with respect to several critical
minerals. For the 0". S. South Africa is a major source, not
only of chromium, manganese, and platinum but also of anti-
mony, asbestos, copper, industrial diamonds, gold, and vana-
dium. [Ref. 40] Western Europe is even more highly




























Figure 3.3 Mineral Resources of south Africa
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4 • 5S Policy toward South Africa
In South Africa the U.S. seeks to encourage
purposeful evolutionary change toward a nonraciai society
and supporting those who seek to build oppportunities not
determined on basis of race. "The Reagan Administration has
no intention of destabilizing South Africa to please any of
the races in South Africa nor alinging themselves with apar-
theid policies", said Crocker [Ref. *M ]• South Africa is an
integral and important element of the global economic
system, and it plays a significant economic role in its own
region. The U.S. will not sever those ties. The U.S. seeks
to build a more constructive relationship with South Africa,
one based on shared interest, persuasion, and improved
communication. A measure of change is already underway in
South Africa and many South Africans of all races are
seeking to move away from apartheid. It is the U.S. policy
to be supportive of this process so that futher reform and
nonviolent change can take place.
5- The US Namibian Factor in General
Namibia, known for many years as South West Africa,
became South Africa's mandate territory as a result of the
Treaty of Versailles that disposed of this German colony at
the conclusion of world War I. At the end of World War II
in 19U6 South Africa applied to the newly created United
Nations, proposing to incorporate the territory as one of
its provinces, but this was rejected by the General
Assembly. After a period of close administration of Namibia
under South African laws South Africa in 1977 finally agreed
in principle to leave the territory and allow it to become




The question of Namibian independence has no*, been
resolved And in an effort to find a pratical, internation-
ally acceptable solution to the Namibian problem in the
spring of 1977 a contact group was established of five
Western members of the UN Security Council-the U.S.,
Britain, France, Canada, and West Germany. The contact
group was organized when South Africa proceeded with a
unilateral internal settlement designed to deny the Namibian
people the right to choose freely and fairly their own form
of government and imposed a South African-designed govern-
ment. The contact group held talks with the parties of the
dispute. Their effort was based on the 1976 Security
Council Resolution 385, which calls for free and fair elec-
tions in Namibia under UN supervision and control. In April
1978 the UN was presented a proposal containing a time table
and set of requirements for holding election under
Resolution 385. South Africa and SWAPO accepted this
proposal with differences on how it would be implemented-
which is still an issue today.
In September the Security Council adopted Resolution
435 which approved the Secretary General* s plan for implex
menting Namibia 1 s independence. South Africa objected to
Resolution 435 and in 1978 held its own elections in Namibia
which was boycotted by major Namibian political parties,
including SWAPO. The winner of the election was the
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance sponsored by South Africa.
The UN declared the elections null and void. Diplomatic
efforts have been underway since then to obtain implementa-
tion of Resolution 435. [Ref. 42]
The outcome in Namibia has important implications.
An international acceptable settlement would show the world
that peaceful solutions to a seemingly unmanageable conflic*
is possible. It would also reduce the likelihood of Soviet
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or Cuban intervention in Namibia. If the situation cannot
be solved it is likely to lead to more bloodshed and outside
power involvement.
Namibia now accounts for 6 percent of the world's
uranium production and the new uranium mine developed by the
Rio-Tinto Zinc Corporation at Rossing is described as the
largest uranium mine in the world. In addition Namibia is a
significant producer of diamonds and gems, copper, lead,
vanadium, tungsten, zinc, cadmium, arsenic, and salt and a
minor producer of other metals. Namibia's uranium resources
could be a major attraction to COMECON countries to secure
nuclear fuel sources for their expanding nuclear power
programs. [Ref. *3: p. 100]
a. Namibia's Economy
Namibia is a rich land with a wealth of untapped
natural resources. The uncertainty concerning its transi-
tion process has had adverse effects on its economy due to
investors reluctance to make commitments until some type of
solution, with South Africa is reached. Despite this reluc-
tance Namibians are optimistic about their eventual role in
the international market. Its chief industries are mining,
fishing, husbandry and agriculture.
Namibia's mining industry ranks 17th out of the
world's 20 major mining countries. It possesses untold
amounts of diamonds, uranium, copper, lead, zinc, manganese,
tin, iron , tungsten, silver, cadmium, vanadium, lithium,
sulphur, and salt. The mining industry alone accounted for
59 percent of Namibia's total exports in 1970. The data
regarding Namibia's mineral wealth is particularly impres-
sive. The Oranjemund mines are the world's richest gem
diamond source. Daimonds account for 66 percent of the
country's total mineral exports and production runs at over
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1.6 million carats a year. The Rossing open uranium mine
was opened for development in 1976 and is scheduled for
production of 1,000 tons of uranium oxide per year. The
Rossing facility is the world's largest and has over 100,000
tons in reserve. Namibia also ranks as the world's second
largest producer of Vanadium and Lithium. The territory was
Africa's largest producer of refined lead (producing 62.700
metric tons in 1972) and the continent's second largest
producer of Cadmium (producing 159,009 metric tons in 1972).
Finally Namibia was the third largest producer of zinc in
Africa (with an output of 34,800 metric tons in 1973).
These are indeed impressive figures that make investors
anxious for a peaceful transition to independence.
[Ref. 44]
The fishing industry in Namibia accounted for 25
percent of the territory's total exports in 1970. The
offshore Benguela Current is the primary fishing ground.
Over 600,000 tons of fish, primarily pilchards are caught
each year and processed in Walvis Bay. Another 3,000 tons
of rock lobsxter are also caught each year and processed at
Luderitz. The choice areas have been heavily over fished by
Soviet, Cuban, and Bulgarian vessels in recent years and has
impacted on South-Africa's decision not to extend the terri-
torial waters to 320 KM. These nations are anxious to nego-
tiate different fishing agreements with a new Namibian
government.
Husbandry has emerged as Namibia's third largest
industry behind mining and fishing. It accounted for 16
percent of the total exports in 1970. Namibia exported 3.9
million Karakul pelts (persian lamb) in 1972 and is
presently the world's largest exporter of this product. The
industry is in far better shape than the fourth and final
sector that of agriculture.
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Since most whites are involved in the management
of the various industries the task of tilling the unrespon-
sive soil is primarily done by the blacks. There are six
basic features of Namibia's agricultural industry. First,
its vulnerability to climatic factors and stock disease.
Second, its dependence on cattle and Karakul sheep. Third,
the inability of the territory's meat and dairy products to
compete regularly on the international markets and the
consequent reliance upon markets in South Africa. Fourth,
the inability to supply any significant percentage of the
grain, vegetable and fruit requirements of the inhabitants;
necessitating large purchases from South Africa. Fifth, the
high standards of farm management required to combat a harsh
and arid environment and difficult marketing problems.
Sixth, the limitations which natural conditions, especially
in the southern sector, impose upon agricultural growth.
[Hef. 45] Farming is thus a difficult and arduous task.
There is a great amount of frustration on the part of the
blacks toward their role in the Namibian economy. swapo
claims that 75 percent of Namibia's choice area, containing
the best farming and mineral land's are controlled by the
whites who irake up only 12 percent of the population. Thus
the redistribution of land will be one of their first tasks
should they attain power.
The economic wealth of Namibia cannot help but
play a role in the lands transition to independence. The
U.S. has many transnation als who have a great interest in
the economic policies that a new government there will
adopt. They will be watching the proceedings quite closedly
as will U.S. policymakers. For Southern Africa contains
enough riches so that if the Soviets should ever establish
control over it they would manage 90 percent of the world's
platinum production; 80 percent of its gold cobalt and
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chrome; 75 percent of its manganese and 70 percent of its
diamonds. [ Hef . 46] The economic potential of the area is
one that took on an additional significance in the wake of
Soviet expansionism into Angola.
b. Namibia's Relationship to South Africa
Namibia cannot compare with South Africa's huge
reserves of minerals, many of them of considerable strategic
importance to the West. However, it is a territory of
considerable economic potential, with substantial mineral
reserves, especially of uranium and diamonds, as well as
base metals. But the lack of infrastructure, especially
water and transport, and the lack of a skilled workforce,
and the political uncertainty, have held back more rapid
economic development.
More important is Namibia's political and
geographic position: it is the last white-ruled colonial
buffer state between black and white Africa. As an added
complication, the effective colonial power is South Africa
itself. The political development of Namibia is likely,
both through example and direct contact, to have an impor-
tant effect on the political development of South
Africa. (Financial Times)
c. OS Policy toward Namibia
The White House policy of constructive engage-
ment toward South Africa means that it will try to maintain
cordial relations in an effort to influence South African
actions. Many nations object to this relationship between
Washington and Pretoria. To some black Africans, the U.S.
appears to be accepting South Africa's policies of racial
separation. But whether they agree with the relationship or
not, other countries now expect the Reagan administration to
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use it constructively by convincing South Africa to relin-
quish control of Namibia.
Because of these expectations, the Namibia
problem contains the seeds of potential trouble for the
Reagan administration. If it wins South African cooperation
on Namibia, it will show that constructive engagement is a
sound policy that can bring positive changes. The adminis-
tration also will have taken a large stride toward its goal
of ending South Africa's international isolation.
But if the U.S. fails to win South African coop-
eration on Namibia, it is sure to be accused of tolerating,
or even encouraging, South Africa's defiant attitudes.
Black Africans won't believe that constructive engagement
can bring changes in South Africa's internal policies.
Namibia is one of Africa's lingering decoloniza-
tion problems, and to black Africans it is a pressing and
emotional issue. Four years ago, the ON adopted a plan to
make Namibia independent and to hold elections for a new
government there. South Africa accepted the plan, but has
refused to carry it out.
South Africa contends that unsupervised elec-
tions would turn control of Namibia over to SWAPO, a rebel
group lead by Sam Nujoma who South Africa regards as a
"communist". [ Ref . 47] The rebels are based across the
Namibian border in Angola, where the government is supported
by some 20,000 Cuban troops [Ref. 48].
During the Carter administration, the U.S.,
Britain, France, West GSermany and Canada - known collec-
tively as the "contact group" - began searching for a way
break the Namibian deadlock. The Reagan administration
hopes to adjust the ON plan to ease some of South Africa's
worries. Before Namibian elections are held, for instance,
the O.S. wants all parties in Namibia to agree to a set of
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principles guaranteeing the rights of the white minority
there. South Africa also would lika some group besides the
UN to supervise the elections.
The sticky point in the contact-group discus-
sions has teen the American and South African desire to
arrange a withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in conjunc-
tion with the Namibian settlement. South Africa is leery of
granting Namibia independence as long as Cuban troops remain
next door in Angola. It fears that the presence of
Communist troops in Angola will bolster Communist groups in
Namibia. The U.S. will object to any plan that allow for the
introduction of Communism into Southern Africa.
So U.S. strategy is to find a Namibian plan that
insures the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Critics
contend that it only complicates and delays the Namibian
solution. They believe that Angola will send the Cuban
troops home voluntarily once its neighbor, Namibia, is
stable and independent.
6 • West Germany and S o ut h Africa
West Germany's policy towards South Africa is to
urge the replacement of apartheid with economic, social, and
political eguality. Germany believes the best way to achieve
this is through involvement with the white population
although it readily recognizes the stiff resistance of the
Afrikaner government to change. On balance, Germany sees
itself as an honest broker in South Africa, engaged in a
"critical dialogue" which leans towards majority rule as
important to bringing about long-range regional peace and
stability.
Germany seeks to influence South African policy
through diplomatic persuasion, including meeting with black
leaders who operate both within and outside South Africa.
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They support cultural exchanges, not placing restrictions on
visas for South Africans (as the Dutch have) because they
feel this presents the possibility of blacks as well as
whites coming to Germany.
a. German Economic ties with South Africa
German economic ties with South Africa are
increasing. German off ica Is say, this is due to the flour-
ishing economy of South Africa. Large contracts for coal
and uranium imports have been signed and private banks have
significantly increased their lending. Two-way trade
between Germany and South Africa in 1979 was over $3
billion. German banks made a total of $2.4 billion in loans
to South Africa from 1972 to 1978. West German trade and
investment with South Africa represent nearly 1% for the
Dnited States. Germany imports 60% of its chromium, 503 of
its manganese and plantinum, and 90% of its asbestos from
South Africa. In 1977 South Africa was West Germany's
largest African export market. During the first guarter of
1980, imports from West Germany totalled R362 million. They
grew during the first quarter of 1981 to about R290 million.
Imports are predominantly raw materials, some strategic, and
85% of German exports to South Africa are end-products.
The thirty-three largest German companies oper-
ating in South Africa have approximately 22,000 employees.
Germany's direct investment of $336 million makes it the
largest investor in South Africa. Investments are concen-
trated in Volkswagen, Daimler-Benz, Metal-Gess elschaft,
Hoechst, AEG Telefunken, and Siemens. Lurgi, and engi-
neering group, provided the design and special equipment
used at the three South African Coal, Oil, and Gas
Corporation (SASOL) plants. The process used in SASOL was
adapted from a German technique, and German companies are
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heavily involved in the transfer of technology and expertise
to South Africa. Of the 140,000 German nationals in South
Africa, 15,000 to 20,000 are empolyed by German companies.
German immigration, which had been heavy in the past, has
recently begun to taper off.
As a precondition to the insurance of loan guar-
antees to Companies doing business in South Africa, the
German government now requires a declaration of support for
the EEC code of conduct for companies with interests in
South Africa. Delegations from German trade unions have
visited South Africa to check on compliance. However,
according to a 1980 study by Intecontecs LTD., an interna-
tional consulting firm, many German companies have pursued
a relatively independent policy in South Africa regarding
enforcement of the code, with some arguing that it limits
their ability to compete with those companies not required
to conform.
The German government does not support economic
sanctions, trade boycotts, or prohibitions on investments.
Chancellor Schmidt has said that it is not his government's
policy "to destroy the economic structures of South Africa,
plunge the country into economic chaos, and hurt the very
sections of the population most badly whom we would like to
help the most: the black majority, which would have to
suffer most from the resulting unemployment.
The FRG, EC, and Japan are much more dependent
on South Africa than the U. S. (see Table V) This also shows
that Germany and the EC rely significantly on South Africa
for gold and uranium, while the U.S. is self-sufficient in
uranium. Por most of the crucial minerals supplied by South
Africa, Western Europe, and Japan import between 75% and
100% of total consumption. [Eef. 49: p. 70]
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The FRG has almost no minerals resources and is
thinking about a mineral deal with the Soviets. West
Germany is 100% dependent on imports in aluminum, tungsten,
nickel, titanium, molydenum, vanadium, antimony, mercury,
platinum, manganese, chromite, zirconium, asbestos,
magnesite, and phosphate. It is 99.8% import-dependent in
copper, 93% in iron, 87% in lead, and 68% in zinc. Germany
has been stockpiling such critical ores as chromity, cobalt,
and manganese. A shift to the Soviet Union as a principle
supplier would reflect Bonn's uncertainty about developments
in Southern Africa and U.S. policy toward Pretoria. Schmidt
may be bargaining for Soviet neutrality in Southern Africa.
In 1977 Wolfgang Ulrich, the foremost German specialist on
minerals resources geopolitics warned: "Europe cannot
afford to allow third parties to upset the process of
peaceful change which is about to start in Southern Africa."
CRef. 50]
b. German* s interest in Namibia
Germany's only special African tie is with
Namibia. There is a 28,000 person German minority there-
which represents 3% of the total population or 30% of the
white population. The German government feels some respon-
sibility for these persons who, in general, support the
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)
.
Germany also accepts
that SWAFO will play an important role in an independent
Namibia.
Germany has worked hard, both in the "contact
group" and unilateraly, to bring the various Namibian
parties to an agreement on UN Resolution 435. It has worked
with the ethnic Germans who are organized in an interest
group and has invited SWAPO leader, Sam Nujoma, to Germany a
number of times. Nujoma visited in November 1980 at which
66

time he made explicit his willingness to recognize the civil
rights of Namibians. At the January 1981 Geneva Conference
on Namibia a deputy to Foreign Minister Genscher chaired a
meeting at which Njuoma and SWAPO representatives met with
the Namibian Interest Group. Nujoma stated at this time
that SWAPO would need the white population to run the
country and the German government gave indications that it
would be willing to give strong financial support to an
independent Namibia.
The failure of the January 1981 Geneva
Conference on Namibian independence is viewed as only a
temporary setback. A reevaluation of policy is now taking
place on the part of all parties but it is unclear what the
next steps will be. It is believed that the call for
economic sanctions against South Africa made by the African
group at the ON was a "ritual" condemnation. West Germany
does not believe that pressure or coercion will work with
South Africa. It now sees the issue as building trust
between parties which are sworn enemies and which had never
formally met before the January conference. However,
Germany is greatly concerned that the U.S. may back away
from the "contact group" efforts to negotiate independence
which it continues to view as being important. [ Ref . 51: p.
67]
E. CASE STUDY: EI SALVADOR
Central America, is seen by the U.S. as a convenient
area for the U.S. to intervene and to challenge what is
perceived as Soviet expansionism. One of the places the U.S.
has chosen to "break the Communist winning streak"
[Ref. 52], is El Salvador. Secretary of State Haig stated:
"We can do this by demonstrating, as we are doing in El
Salvador today, that a government bent on making necessary
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reforms will not be overthrown by armed intervention
supported by Moscow or its surrogatas Our problem with
El Salvador is external intervention in the internal affairs
of a sovereign nation in this hemisphere." [Ref. 53]
To the Reagan administration El Salvador represents a
familiar case of Soviet, Cuban, and Dther Communist military
involvement in a politically troubled Third World country.
The Communist have greatly increased the suffering of the
Salvadoran people and intensified and widened the conflict
by providing arms, training, and direction to a local insur-
gency. The Soviet objective in El Salvador is to bring
about the overthrow of the established government and impo-
sition of a Communist regime in defiance of the will of the
Salvadoran people at as little cost to the Communists as
possible. [Ref. 54]
1 . Eackgroun d on El Sa lvador
For decades El Salvador suffared under the dictator-
ship of a tiny oligarchy that monopolized land, credit, and
trade. On October 15, 1979, young military officers broke
with the old system of repression and joined with moderate
civilian leaders to establish a peaceful democratic revolu-
tion. This date is considered a watershed in Salvadoran
history. The new Revolutionary Junta of two military colo-
nels and three civilians, freed political prisoners and
committed themselves to social and economic reforms,
respectful of human rights, and democratic elections.
Within weeks, the Revolutionary Junta came under attack from
the left and right. And so began the upheaval that is still
bloodying the country today. Between October 1979 and
January 1980 the Junta gradually disintegrated, unable to
control the violence or establish its authority.
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In January 1980, the Christian Democratic party with
an overwhelming majority of military officers entered the
government and helped launch far-reaching reforms. Although
most Salvadorans welcomed social reforms, extremist groups
reacted by intensifying violence. Thousands died in condi-
tions sometimes bordering on anarchy.
Today there is a broad array of political forces
that oppose the Junta-Christian Democrats, Social Democrats
and Liberal Democrats, as well as independent Marxist groups
and pro-Moscow coalitions. It is an over simplification to
reduce the opposition to a handful of Marxist guerrillas
manipulating the "non -Marxists". There is a Christian oppo-
sition from which at least twenty-sight catholic priests,
nuns, and community leaders have been murdered for possible
opposition activities against the regime. Many public
organizations such as churches, trade, unions, independent
newspapers and peasant co-ops have been forced to resort to
guerrilla type activities because political channels or
options have been closed. There have also been some moder-
ates that split off from the Junta and joined the
Revolutionary Democratic Front. [Ref. 55]
a. The Guerrillas of 31 Salvador - The Extreme Left
The extreme left, which includes the long-estab-
lished Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES) and three small
non-Marxist-Leninist political parties have become increas-
ingly more committed to a mili solution since 1976. In the
late 1970s, these organizations carried out several specta-
cular embassy seizures and kidnapped or murdered several
Salvadoran, U.S., European, and Japanese businessmen, as
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During 1980, the fragmented groups of the left
agreed to coordinate their action in support of a joint
military battle plan developed with Cuban assistance. In
late 1980, in exchange for large-scale Cuban aid, Salvadoran
guerrilla leaders met in Havana and formed several organi-
zations. The Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) was
formed as their central executive arm for political and
military planning. The Farabundo Marti 1 People's Liberation
Front (FMLN) , named after the leader of the 1932 revolt, was
formed as the coordination body of the guerrilla organiza-
tion. A front organization, the Revolutionary Democratic
Front (FDR), was also created to disseminate propaganda
abroad. For appearance the small non-Marxist-Leninist poli-
tical parties (FDR and FMLN) were established but have no
representation in the DRtJ. The Salvadoran guerrillas,
through the FDR, have deceived many about what is happening
in El Salvador. They have been aided by Nicaragua and by
the worldwide propaganda networks of Cuba, the Soviet Onion
and other Communist countries.
b. El Salvador's Far Right
Not having control of the government, opponents
of change resorted to private death squads and vigilante
bands in a war against reforms. In early 1980, Major
Roberto D' Aubuisson, a National Guard officer forced into
retirement in October 1979, denounced the Christian
Democratic-military coalition as a Communist movement aimed
at destroying the traditional fabric of Salvadoran society.
He served as a rallying point for those landowners, local
bosses, and security force members against reforms.
Christian Democrats and Catholic activists
became targets, many of which were coordinated by a clandes-
tine organization called "Maximiliano Hernandez
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Brigade"-named for the man who crushed the 1932 revolt. On
March 24. 1980, Archbishop Romero was shot while saying
mass. Since then, several priests and foreign missionaries
and more than 60 Christian Democratic mayors and local offi-
cials have been assassinated, as well as several hundred
trade unionists and thousands of ordinary people - often not
knowing if the extreme right or left was responsible. On
December 1980, four American Catholic women-three nuns and a
social worker- were murdered. In January 1981, two American
labor specialists from the A. P. L.- C.I.O. were assassinated
together with the head of El Salvador's land reform
institute.
The right extremist had a natural recruitment
base in former members of the White Warriors Union and
ORDEN, ORDEN being a conservative organization made up of
thousands of peasants with close ties to local security
forces and the White Warriors Union being a clandestine
group of far rightists. Retired and active duty police and
military personnel linked to individuals landowners or
personally opposed to the government were another source of
support. At the same time, guerrilla attacks against
uniformed personnel cause violent reaction from the righ-
tists driving them to more violence. Retired military have
been assassinated while pursuing civilian occupations. In
October 1980, guerrillas burned an officer's home to the
ground with himself, wife, and three children trapped
inside. During the first half of 1981, approximately 1,300
uniformed men were either wounded or killed by guerrillas
and some of these were killed bv execution.
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2. OS Policy toward El Salvador
a. OS Basis for Support of El Salvador
The following sections C-E present the Offical
U.S. view on El Salvador taken from Offical State Department
documents. In some cases these documents were not designed
so much to clarify the situation in El Salvador as to
provide justification for the administration's position of
casting issues in East-West terms.
Before September 1980 the divided guerrilla
groups in El Salvador were unorganized and poorly armed with
an assortment of pistols, hunting rifles, and shotguns.
After the late 1979 and early 1980 Havana meeting the Cubans
worked with the DRO to obtain arms from Vietnam, Ethiopia,
the PLO, and Eastern Europe. In December 1980 the guer-
rillas began to employ O.S. made M-16 and M-14 rifles, M-79
grenade launchers, and Chinese-made rockets-propelled
grenade launchers. In January 1981, Salvadoran authorities
destroyed an aircraft flying arms from Nicaragua to El
Salvador. Honduran authorities captured a truck carrying
weapons and ammunition destined for the guerrillas.
[Eef. 56]
Most of the M-16s on the truck were individually
traced directly to Vietnam where they had been left behind
by U.S. units. By January 1981 the guerrillas had acquired
modern weapons and supporting equipment never before used in
El Salvador. In addition to the U.S. weapons already
described the guerrillas also possessed Belgian FAL rifles,
german g- 3 rifles, Israeli OZI submachinegun and Galil
assault rifle, .30 to .50 caliber, Russian hand grenades,
57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles. Since late 1979 a series
of contracts between Salvadoran communist leaders and key
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officials of several communist states resulted in commitment
to supply the guerrillas with nearly 800 tons of the most
modern weapons and equipment. By January 1981 nearly 200
tons of arms were covertly delivered through Cuba and
Nicaragua. [Ref. 57] During this same time period 1977 to
January 1981 the United states provided no weapons or ammu-
nition to the Salvadoran Armed Forces.
Several important document caches were captured
from the guerrillas in November 1980 and January 1981. This
was a mass capture which included battle plans, letters, and
reports of meetings and travels. When verified against
other evidence and other intelligence sources these docu-
ments make it possible to reconstruct the centrcl role
played by Cuba and other Communist countries in political
unification, military direction, and equipping the insur-
gents in less than 6 months with an impressive array of
modern weapons that enabled the guerrillas to launch a well-
armed offensive.
The guerrillas with Cuban and Soviet support
stuck to their original plan as called for in documents
found in caches between November 1980 and January 198 1. On
January 10, 1981 using modern weapons the guerrillas
launched a general offensive, striking at 40-50 locations,
downing two helicopters, overrunning an isolated National
Guard post and forcing the army to use much of its reserve
ammunition.
The Reagan administration presents the view that
there is little doubt that the Salvadoran insurgency has
become the objective of a significant commitment by
Communist states outside of Latin America. The political
direction, organization, and arming of the insurgency is
coordinated and heavily influenced by Cuba-with support of
the Soviet Onion, East Germany, Vietnam, and other Communist
7a

states. The massing and delivery of arms to the Salvadoran
guerrillas by the Communist was during a period when the
U.S. provided no weapons or ammunitioa to El Salvador. The
overwhelming mass of arms and assistance is conducted by the
Communist who have made a major effort to conceal their
activity by supplying arms of Western manufacture and by
supporting front organization known as the Democratic
Revolutionary Front to seek non-Communist political support
through propaganda.
It is clear to the Reagan administration that in
recent years the insurgency in El Salvador has been progres-
sively transformed into another case of indirect armed
aggression against a Third World country by Communist powers
acting through Cuba. The United States considers it of
great importance that the American people and the world
community be aware of the seriousness of the actions of
Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other Communist states who are
conducting a well-coordinated, covsrt operation to bring
about the overthrow of El Salvador's established government
and replace it with a Communist regime. [Ref. 58]
When Cuban activities in Latin America (in coun-
tries like Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras,
Jamaica, Guyana, Grenada, Dominican Republic, Colombia,
Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay) are examined it becomes ever-
more clear that Cuba is directly engaged in efforts to
encourage armed insurrections and their activities mili-
tarize and internationalize what would otherwise be local
conflicts. This is made clear by a country-by-counytry
examination in Latin America (and especially Central America
in which the Cubans have been the most active) reveals that
since 1978, Cuba has:
1. Worked to unite traditionally splintered radical
groups behind a commitment to armed struggle with
Cuban advice and material assistance;
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2. Trained ideologically committed cadres in urban and
rural guerrilla warfare;
3. Supplied or arranged for the supply of weapons to
support the Cuban trained cadres* efforts to assume
power by force ;
4. Encouraged terrorism in the hope of provoking indis-
criminate violence and repression, in order to weaken
government legitimacy and attract new converts to
armed struggle; and
5. Used military aid and advisers to gain influence over
guerrilla fronts and radical governments through
armed pro-Cuban Marxists.
6. Cuba's enormous investment of energy, money, and
agents in these areas would not be possible without
Soviet help. Soviet assistance, now totaling over $8
million a day, enables Cuba to maintain the best
eguipped and largest per capita military forces in
Latin America. [ Ref . 59]
b. Past OS Policy toward El Salvador
The U.S. believes that Salvadorans should be
allowed to resolve their o wn problems without coercion or
dictation from any source and there would be no a.S involve-
ment, if the communist were not involved.
During the 1970s, reflecting general policy
trends, U.S. economic and military assistance to El Salvador
declined sharply. Military assistance was terminated in
1977. U.S. economic assistance increased modestly after the
El Salvador 1980 reforms created a framework for cooperation
insuring that aid would reach the needy and the poor.
Military trucks and radios were sold on credit, but no




On January 16, 1981, in response to the
Com muni st- armed guerrilla offensive, the Carter
Administration resummed arms sales for the first time in 3
years. Helicopters and some military trainers were also
sent. The Reagan Administration authorized additional
military supplies and services totaling $35 million and
doubled economic assistance to more than $100 million . In
mid-1981, 55 U.S. military trainers were in El Salvador
under orders to perform no duties of a combat nature or any
training that could engage them in combat.
c. Present U.S. Policy toward El Salvador
On July 16, 198 1, assistance Secretary of State
Thomas 0. Enders noted that O.S. assistance was preventing
the guerrillas from turning their foreign arms supplies to
new advantage, but that El Salvador remained a divided
country. The U.S. believes that only salvadorans can solve
those divisions and that neither the U.S. or any other
foreign country can solve the divisions. The U.S. offical
policy is to support the objective of the Salvadoran
Government itself overcoming these divisions by establishing
a more democratic system not because of a desire to repro-
duce an American system but rather out of the belief that
only a pluralistic approach can enable a profoundly divided
society to live with itself without violent disturbance,
gradually overcoming its differences.
The present administration believes that El
Salvador can accomplish this by (1) promises of land reform
should be kept. Land reform should be effected now not more
debate on whether land reform is advisable or not. (2)
controlling and eliminating violence from all sources.
Communist supplies to the guerrillas must stop. More
Salvadoran army leadership is needed to fight rightist death
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squads and to control security force violence. (3) All
parties that renounce violence participate in the design of
new political institutions and the process of choosing
representatives for them. Both the extreme left and right
opposed the March 82 elections. The U.S. and the centralist
governments view not to grant the left through negotiations
the share of power the rebels have not been able to win in
war. It is believed by the Reagan administration that El
Salvador's leaders are willing to compete with the insur-
gents at the polls. And (U) a political solution cannot
succeed without assistance from the United States. The
point is not that assistance from the United States might
lead to a government military victory; It is that a poli-
tical solution can only be achieved if the guerrillas
realize they cannot win by military force.
The offical U.S. policy objective is to prevent
a victory of leftist forces by implementing the following
strategy: (1) extending economic and military assistance to
counter the Communist intervention in El Salvador. (2)
Support El Salvador while they work out a democratic solu-
tion; and (3) Identify and seize opportunities to help such
a solution actually take place. It is believed by the
administrations foreign policy experts, that the El
Salvadoran centralist government and it's program offers the
best chance for evolutionary reform, political liberation,
and respect for human rights.
An opposing view and possibly a less biased view
is that of the Mexican government. In the political realm,
significant Mexican involvement in El Salvador has consisted
of direct opposition. The Mexican government and ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party are firm supporters of
Salvadoran leftist. Mexico City is the principle base of
operations for the FDR's efforts to gain diplomatic support.
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The Mexican policy is based upon an assessment of Central
American military governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras cannot long survive the growing demands of the poor
for social change. Stability in the region therefore
reguires that these narrowly-based dictatorial regimes be
replaced with popular governments willing to dismantle the
oligarchic land-owning systems and distribute the benefits
of development to a broader section of the population.
While the Mexicans have no desire to see a pro-Soviet
Marxist-Leninist regime in Central America, they see funda-
mental change as inevitable and believe that strong interna-
tional support for social democratic opposition elements
offers the best hope for long-term stability. Based upon
their experience of peaceful coexistence with Cuba, the
Mexicans are confident that they can live cordially with
whatever form of revolutionary government that emerges.
This same view is shared by a number of key European Social
Democratic parties, including those in Germany. German
leaders disagree with the O.S in this area as well as the
degree of the threat of Communism, and the priority of peace
or rolling back communism.
3. Germany and El Salv ador
German interest in Latin America has been mainly
ecomomic. In the 1950s, German trade and investments in
Latin America represented a significant percent of overall
German foreign economic activity; however, in recent years
there has been a relative decline in German dealings with
Latin America, in contrast to the FRG*s increased activities
in Africa, It is only with the racent rise in political
importance of the issue of raw materials that the Latin
American countries have acquired more importance for Bonn,
as for other industrialized countries. The FRG^ political
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relations with the states of Latin America have been
limited, and a large part of Germany* s economic investments
there - almost one-half - are concentrated in Brazil. It is
only with the recent rise in political importance of the
issue of raw materials that the Latin American countries
have acquired more importance for Bonn, as for other indus-
trialized countries. [Ref. 60: p. 63]
In the past Latin America has been considered by the
Germans as the backyard of the U.S. and, as a consequence,
has received little political attention as indicated by the
absence of limited amount of development aid programs. (See
Table VII) . Latin America was farther away and just not as
important as other areas. Activity in Latin America was
left to commercial endeavours, and it was not until the late
sixties that Bonn undertook large aid programs, political
experiments like training of union officals, and the
transfer of a nuclear power station to Brazil which created
six thousand German jobs for six years. [Ref. 61]
It is in this context as well as the perception of
the Soviet threat that Germany views El Salvador. The
Germans, just as the O.S., supports a political solution in
El Salvador. However, Germany believes the main reasons for
the conflict is the government's hesitance to implement
reforms, hold elections, and alleviate social injustice.
German leader's assessment of the Soviet threat is at odds
with the O.S. assessment in that they do not feel the degree
of the Soviet threat is as great as the O.S. believes it to
be. At the same time the FHG realizes that their security
is based on the O.S. guarantee of protection and thus if
they expect the O.S. to be capable of bearing great respon-
sibility, then they cannot deny the O.S. the ability to
solve a problem like El Salvador even if this means
supporting a less than ideal government. [Ref. 62]
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Many Europeans disagree with the Reagan assessment.
They see the Guerrilla tide sweeping the area, as home grown,
with perhaps some Marxist support. They see the promise of
radical change under the guerrillas as the way the people of
Central America want to go. Prance is much stronger in its
disagreement than other European countries in that it is
providing arms to Nicaragua in direct opposition to the U.S.
[Ref. 63: p. 12]
Many see Cuban influence losing ground in Latin
America by pointing out the fact that over the last 2
years, Columbia, Costa Rica, and Jamaica suspended or broke
relations with Cuba. Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador withdrew
their ambassadors from Havana.
German policy is to use every opportunity to bring
political stability to Central America. The Federal govern-
ment adheres to a view that civil war in El Salvador can
best be ended by an understanding between democratic forces
in both camps. In late 19 80 and early 1981 Germany took an
aggressive role in trying to bring the two sides together.
The Federal Republic was reguested by several countries in
the area-one of which was Costa Rica- to mediate between
both sides in the conflict. The FRG made a conserted effort
to solve the conflict by attempting to bring the parties
together in the Federal Republic and mediate a settlement.
By March 1981 the FRG's attempt at mediation failed and the
reason given by the Bonn government was the reluctance and
even the negative attitude of both sides to talk to one
another. [Ref. 64] The leader of the Revolutionary
Democratic Front (FDR) Guillermo Manuel Ongo has stated that
he is willing to talk with the U.S. and other governments,
but has rejected a direct dialogue with the El Salvadoran
government and junta President Josa Napolean Duarte "who
does not have true power" [Ref. 65]. At the present time
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both sides in El Salvador have enough outside support to
believe they have a chance to win. The Guerrillas believe
they have more to lose by elections (run by their opponents)
at this time. This is where the U.S. and the FRG disagree.
The U.S. believes that concessions should not be given to
the guerrillas that could not be won. Foreign Minister Ola
Ullsten statements on the situation in SI Salvador irritated
the U.S. Department of State when he directly criticized the
U.S. decision to step up its military aid, which he said
only leads to the prolongation of the fighting and allows
the centralist to believe they can win without giving
concessions to the leftist.
The FRG sees the situation as: on one side there is
the Fidelist party which is receiving its arms from Soviet
countries and on the other side a military junta, when it
overthrew General Romera' s dictatorship, contained many
Christian Democrats and proposed to carry out an agrarian
reform program. The revolutionaries went all cut against a
reformist effort and contributed to the junta's shift to the
right. The conservative military strengthened their influ-
ence and Christian Democrats abandoned an apparently
shinking ship. The extreme rightwing guerrillas are
abducting and mudering people and adding to the civil war's
horror. [Hef. 66]
The FRG opposes all use of violence in El Salvador,
whether from the right or the left. The situation is futher
complicated by the fact that the two lajor political parties
in Germany, the SPD and CDU, maintain separate relations
with both groups in El Salvador. The left in the form of
the Social Democratic Party of Germany has no hesitation in
siding with the national front. Hans Juergen Wischenwski,
who is close to the chancellor, is proclaiming the govern-
ment party's solidarity with the Salvadoran opposition.
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Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hamm Bruecher praises
the junta's effort. The official government position is to
call for reasonable but inopportuns talks between both
sides. [Ref. 67]
The social democratic party is on record as
supporting the FDR and opposing any deeper U.S. military
involvement in El Salvador. They have cast themselves as
intermediaries between the government and opposition - so
far to no effect.
Since there is no trust between the Salvadoran
government and the guerrillias certain necessary conditions
must be met for negotiations to take place: (1) each side
must believe their is no hope for winning a military victory
in the short run; (2) each side must believe the other side
will not gain a military advantage during negotiations; (3)
each side must believe the other side will comply with what
ever political process comes out of a peaceful conference.
Even with these conditions political pressure will have to
be applied. The political situation that exists now in El
Salvador provides an opportunity for these conditions to
come about but as U.S. military and economic aid is
increased the chances are being reduced. The Reagan admin-
istration by no longer tying aid to reforms and human rights
is sending the signal to the Salvadoran government it will
tolerate whatever level of violence pacification requires.
[Ref. 68]
The U.S. should be putting conditions on their
support for El Salvador. It is crucial for the U.S. to play
an active role in supporting a dialogue. As the major
supplier of aid only the a. S. has the ability to bring the
Salvadoran government to a negotiating table and insure
compliance of any agreements. Germany and other socialist
democratic governments can probably bring the guerrillas to
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a negotiating table. The problem is the Reagan administra-
tion has decided to "draw the line in El Salvador" and make
it an example of U.S. resolve to stop the spread of Soviet
influence in the Third World-it is hard to "draw" the line"
and fail to win a victory.
One of the strongest critiques of U.S. El Salvadoran
policy appeared in an editorial in the Frankfurter Rundschau
15 January 1981. Carl Grobe critized Secretary of State
Haig for placing U.S. interest higher than treaties such as
the OAS charter and reducing foreign policy to the denomi-
nator of anxi-communism. Grobe states that the focus of
U.S. policy is narrowing dangerously. There are only
enemies and conspirators and anyone who stands up against
U.S. interest is bound to be a communist. Each and every
social reform movement, and much more so any revolutionary
revolt, is taken as the work of Moscow's agents. As a
result, any reform movement leads to confrontation with the
Soviets. Grobe also charges that the U.S. condones terror
as long as it is not done by the communists and that it is
permissible to conclude alliances with despots like Syngman
Rhee in South Korea, Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam, and President
Duarte in El Salvador, the main thing being that they are
not communist. Grobe also disagrees with Haig in that for
Germany peaceful survival under conditions prescribed by
Germany has the highest priority rather than rolling back
communism which the U.S. has placed the highest priority.
To Grobe the Reagan confrontation scheme is unacceptable on
principles for the Social Democrats and liberals in their
approach to the Third World and El Salvador. Social
Democrats and liberals cannot accept a situation were juntas
such as in El Salvador are declared friends without any
critism. [ Ref . 69]
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All the actors in the El Salvador conflict declare
that they recognize the need for a political rather than a
military solution to the civil war. But, so far, the
obstacle to negotiations between the government and opposi-
tion has been the belief of each party that the other lacks
sincerity. At the present a military stalement exists which
provides an opportunity for the arrangement of a political
solution, but this situation is changing rapidly because of
the elections and flood of aid. As the Reagan administra-
tion and the leftist supporters continue to provide massive
amounts of economic and military aid to the Salvadcran
government and guerrillas both sides become increasingly
convinced that their drive for military victory will be
underwritten. The fact that the U.S. no longer ties aid to
reforms or human rights means, to the Salvadoran, that the
U.S. will tolerate and encourage whatever it takes for
pacification.
The West German view is very close to that of the
Mexican's in that they see the problem as home grown, with
some Marxist support and social change inevitable with the
benefits of development transferred to a broader section cf
the population. The FRG believes that aid to El Salvador
should be based on reform and the Salvadoran government
should sit down at the negotiating table with the left and
work out a peaceful solution. The PRG believes that they
can bring the FDR-FMLN to the bargaining table if the U.S.
can bring the Salvadoran government to the negoticating
table, with the threat of a cutoff of aid if necessary.
The analysis of U.S. and FRG policy toward the Third
World shows that their interest and motivations are similar
but that differences in their economies and perceptions
cause differences in their priorities and strategy. Both
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IV . CONCLUSION
Despite differences in priorities and strategies, German
— American Third World policies tend to be complementary.
At the same time, decisions made by the U.S. or the FRG on
such issues as economics, security, and raw material supply
have consequences for the Third World regardless of the
degree of German- American agreement. As a result of this
situation, conflicts are more possible now than in the past.
The declining strength of the U.S. as a superpower as well
as the nature of the international environment makes
conflicts more likely.
We have seen that U.S. interests and motivations in the
Third World are similar to those of the FRG. But, there are
differences in their economies and perceptions which cause
differences in their priorities and strategy. The U.S. is a
Superpower and economic giant whereas the FRG is not. This
gives the U.S. more flexibility between directly cooperating
with the FRG or temporary coalitions against the FRG. This
is enhanced by the fact that ths FRG's strengths and
weakness are interrelated. The economic capacity of the FRG
is connected to its dependence on exports and greater
vulnerability to economic stress and at the same time the
FRG sees itself as the country most directly exposed to the
growing military power of the Soviet Union, but has no
possibility of meeting this threat alone. Although the FRG
is growing in importance for the Third World, especially in
Africa and Latin America, the FRG will continue to have no
capability to project itself as a military power, and yet,
as a result of its economic interest, it will be
increasingly entangled in regional conflicts (Southern
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Africa) or will appear as a direct competitor to the U.S.
(Latin America) .
From this survey of the U.S. and the FRG, in the Third
World, it has emerged very clearly that the German approach
is strongly marked by the philosophy of economic liberalism.
As stated by Ambassadopr Jaenicke "We Europeans, after all,
have not freed ouselves painfully in the course of our
history from the fetters of feudalism and mercantilism, of
protectionism and totalitarian planned economy, only to
agree today to a worldwide program, which moreover would be
run by the present majority in the UN". The dominant role
of economics in the FRG's foreign relations is the heart of
national policy making. When the FRG resists the demands of
the Third World, and the desires of many of its western
partners to go along with them, the FRG is using its
economic strength in pursuit of political objections.
The FRG has tremendous economic strength, but this
strength depends on others. One job in every four in German
industry depends on production in export. The importance to
the FRG of export markets among LDC's plays a key role and
helps to explain its active concern with the problems of
North-South economic relations, as does Germany's dependence
on imported raw materials. This double dependence on export
markets and raw materials determines to a large degree the
amount of emphasis the FRG will place on the management of
the international economic environment. And Germany*s
economic strength is being used to achieve certain political
purposes, such as shaping the international environment in
ways conforming to the FRG»s own interest. The FRG does
seek an improvement in North-South economic relations and a
fair deal for raw material producers, but a deal
corresponding to Germany* s ideas of fairness, and not
breaking the German tradition of economic liberalism. The
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U.S. also operates (to a lesser degree than the FRG) on
economic liberalism. The U.S. is less vulnerable to any
cutoff of its sources of supply of raw materials and the
fluctuations of the international economy and this
difference in degree of economic vulnerability causes a
difference in perspective. The U.S. can develop longer-term
strategies and priorities to problems and can take a harder
stand on the short-term issues.
This economic relationship overlaps into the other key
issues which threaten to cause friction between the U.S. and
the FRG. Fragile and unstable states in the Third World
threaten (to a different degree) ths well-being of both the
U.S. and the FRG. An unstable situation allows for
superpower involvement and for the developement of a
possible crisis which could threaten security and access to
minerals. The Germans believe that the Soviets are not as
great a threat as the U.S. believes them to be, that the
Soviets are losing influence in Latin America and Southern
Africa and that with more patience will move away from the
Soviet Union and closer to the West. The FRG sees over
emphasis and overreaction to a Soviet threat as harmful to
arms control negotiation and causing local conflicts to
intensify, which could threaten the international
environment. The U.S. does not place as much emphasis as
the FRG on contact and dialogue because it is not as
vulnerable as the FRG and can take a harder stand on issues
if the U.S. determines it to be in their best interest.
Thus different strategies and priorities are developed to
obtain the basic interest of both countries in the Third
World. These basic interests ars essencially the same:
access to minerals, denial of assets to the Soviets,




At the end of the sixties the German political scientist
Hans Peter Schwarz identified a range of roles which the FRG
played in the international system "first, the German's
favorite role of the economic man; next, the twin main roles
of potential victim of Soviet presure and potential vassal
of the United States; and finally, the combined roles, in
the European Community, of partner of France and Britain."
Schwarz characterized the style in which the FRG played
these roles as "the sober pragmatism of a domesticated great
power". Today, despite the addition of new roles, the
central role (economic) that Schwarz identified is the
same. [Bef. 70 pp. 219-260.]
Since economic issues have come to occupy such a central
role in the international environment (without the
importance of security issues being any less), the economic
strength of the FRG is cast in a central role-whether in
North-South or East-West relations and the economic strength
of the FRG becomes a political fores as well. The obvious
constraints of the FRG's dependence on North-South relations
for markets and raw materials suggest the emergence of a
further political-economic role as an important partner of
the Third world. However, the FRG's most important
relationships are still those of the late sixties: the U.S.
as protector, the Soviet Union as potential threat, and
France and Britain as partners in the European Community.
What has changed is the degree of strength and influence
enjoyed by the FRG. Germany is increasingly pursuing a more
independent foreign policy due mainly to its increased
freedom to act which was acquired by its development of
Ostpolitik and the alleviation of the constraints of the
Hallstein Doctrine. At the same time Germany is forced to
increase its influence because it can depend less on the
U.S. for security due to increased American vulnerabilities.
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Today the FRG can take the lead in many of the roles it
plays.
Because of the overriding German interest in a stable
political and economic environment (resulting from
insecurity and economic interdependence) the FRG's
influential position is very often used to bring its
partners together when there is a risk of their divergences
causing instability. One example is when the problems of
energy and the Middle East caused a rift between the Onited
States and France early in 1974, the FRG pressed for the
"Gymnich Formular" of a systematic consultation between
Europe and the United States.
The continued development of the FRG*s authority and
ability to influence events will inevitably be accompanied
by varying degrees of friction. Specific acts of German
policy are bound to provoke disappointment or disagreement.
However, the FRG • s foreign policy today shows that its
economic power has been consistently used for an improvement
of the international environment as well as Germany's own
immediate interests.
The FRG is an important partner for the U.S. in matters
of alliance teamwork (including military confrontation with
the Soviet Union) and in promoting Third World cooperation.
For the U.S. it is important that divergence of issues with
the FRG be reached that does not endanger the FRG's
stability and supportive capacity. Stability of the
international environment is vitally important for both the
U.S. and the FRG and can only be decisively influenced in
agreement. Today German-American cooperation is more
necessary and more difficult than ever. It reguires a kind
of political leadership that has no parallel in history.
The common interest in Germany's stability in the long run
is vital for the U.S. stability and security.
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The analysis presented here has shown that there are
tensions and divergences of interests between the PRG and
the U.S. due to Germany's increased authority on one hand,
its international dependence on the other, and the
international environment itself. However, even though the
FRG's ability to influence international events has
increased, Germany still operates in the same environment it
did ten years ago-an environment of opportunities and
constraints. And in this environment the divergence of
issues between the U.S. and the FRG, which will probably be
more numerous in the future, are mainly a matter of priority
and strategy. The scarcity in raw materials alone, to which
bcth governments are vulnerable (to different degrees) and
must now anticipate future shortages, will lead to the
adoption of different political strategies and priorities.
Both nations realize that cooperating together they can
contribute more to solving problems in the Third World and














Recipient Loans Grants Total
Europe 625.00 124.45 749.45
Africa 783.50 1,436.75 2,220.25
S. America 227.70 418.15 645. 85
Asia 1,403. 00 787.72 2,190.72
1970--1979
Europe 3,518.351 834.89 4,353.24
Africa 6,609.66 7,706.65 14,316.31
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TABLE II
1979 Trade with South Africa (OS $ million)
-I
Exports
Value % OF SSA % OF world
FRG 1,711 38.6 1.0
OS 1,413 41. 1 0.8
I mporrs
Value % of SSA % of World
FRG 2,006 31.9 1.3
US 2,717 18. 8 1.2
Tc>tal Trade
Value % of SSA % of World
FRG 3,717 34.7 1. 1
OS 4,130 23.1 1.0




Selected Nonfuel Minerals, US Dependence on Foreign
Sources of Suppl/
PERCENTAGE OF OS DEMAND THAT IS NOT MET BY DOMESTIC
MINE AND/OR SECONDARY PRODUCTION
Mineral 1965 1975 1985 (est) 2000 (est)
Bauxite and
Alumina 8U 85 86 81
Chromium 92 90 92 89
Cobalt 93 98 98 97
Copper 22 13 13 18
Manganese 93 98 98 100
Nickel 73 70 67 67
Platinum group 91 84 81 80
Tin 75 71 67 66




South Africa's Minerals Production and Reserves Position
& Supplies to OS
1975
Production Reserves US Imports
% of % of % of % of
world non-commun- world non-com % from































Mineral Impor ts from SA as Percent ages
of the Total Im ports of each Commodi ty to
the In dicated Countries
EEC as Onit€id West Franee Japan
Commodity a whol e KingcLom Germany
Platinum gp
Antimony
24 37 _ 22 38
9 95 50 14 15
Copper 4. 5 4 10 1 21
Iron ore - - - - 2
Nickel 5 - 11 14 21
Vanadium 42 60 50 31 62
Chrome ore 31 15 43 20 87
Ferrochrome 31 15 43 20 87
Manganese ore 31 43 52 40 43
Ferro-
Manganese - 27 14 - -
Asbestos 13 - - - 35
Fluorspar - - - - 23






Major OS Security Aid to El Salvador, FY 1950-1979
(in 1000*s of dollars)








































Official Development Asistance from 1950 to 1977
in Billion DM
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